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Abstract
The paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear in-
come taxation, public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy.
With asymmetric information about labour productivities and public-
goods preferences, the multidimensional mechanism design problem
becomes tractable by requiring renegotiation proofness of the final al-
location of private goods and admission tickets for excludable public
goods. Under an affiliation assumption on the underlying distribu-
tion, optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and admission
fees have the same qualitative properties as in unidimensional mod-
els. These properties are obtained for utilitarian welfare maximization
and for a Ramsey-Boiteux formulation with interim participation con-
straints.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops an integrated model of optimal nonlinear income taxa-
tion and public-goods provision and pricing in a large economy. The model
is useful for determining under what conditions and in what sense the avail-
ability of income taxation, as a source of government finance, alleviates the
tension between incentive constraints and efficiency, redistribution concerns
and financing needs in the provision of public goods. I am particularly in-
terested in the respective roles of income taxes and of admission fees on
excludable public goods.
The paper shows that the traditional alignment of optimal nonlinear in-
come taxation with utilitarian concerns for distribution and of public-goods
provision and pricing with government budget constraints and finance is
inappropriate. Nonlinear income taxation is important for covering gov-
ernment financing needs, and the pricing of public goods can be important
for utilitarian redistribution. For taxes and public-sector prices, the appro-
priate dividing line is not between instruments used for redistribution and
instruments used for finance, but between instruments that are vulnerable
to arbitrage through side-trading among participants and instruments that
are not vulnerable to such arbitrage.
The analysis takes a step towards integrating the three subfields into
which normative public economics has traditionally been divided: the.theory
of public-goods provision; the theory of indirect taxation and public-sector
pricing; and the theory of optimal income taxation. Until recently, these
subfields have mostly been studied separately and relations between them
have been little explored: The theory of public-goods provision focusses on
the elicitation of preferences for public as opposed to private goods; the
theory of indirect taxation and public-sector pricing à la Ramsey-Boiteux
is concerned with the combination of indirect taxes and public-sector prices
used to finance a given public-sector spending requirement when lump sum
taxation is unavailable; the theory of optimal income taxation studies the
equity-efficiency tradeoff that arises when earning ability is unobservable.
Except for the seminal work of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), areas of
overlap — and possible conflict! — between these different lines of investi-
gation have received little attention. Distributive concerns play only a sec-
ondary role in the literature on public-goods provision,1 indirect taxation
and public-sector pricing.2 Elicitation of preferences for public goods plays
1 Exceptions are Christiansen (1981), Boadway and Keen (1993), Blomquist and Chris-
tiansen (2001), Bierbrauer (2002), Cremer and Laffont (2003), Gaube (2003).
2 Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) show that the simple elasticities rule of the Ramsey-
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hardly any role in the literatures on direct and indirect taxation.3 Most im-
portantly, the treatment of government budget constraints, financing needs
and cross-subsidization between activities has not been unified.
As an example, consider the constraints that incentive considerations
impose on the relation between the elicitation of public-goods preferences
and people’s financial contributions. The mechanism design approach to
public-goods provision has shown that these constraints induce a conflict
between first-best efficiency, feasibility and individual rationality so that,
in some settings, the need to finance the public good from voluntary con-
tributions precludes the attainment of an efficient allocation.4 Thus in a
large economy with independent private values, it is impossible to have pos-
itive levels of public-goods provision financed by voluntary contributions:
Because, in such an economy, the cross-section distribution of preferences
is independent of any one person’s preferences, nobody is ever pivotal for
determining public-goods provision levels, and therefore nobody is willing
to make a voluntary financial contribution towards financing them.
For excludable public goods, Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) have
suggested that the costs of public-goods provision be covered by admission
fees. In a large economy with independent private values, the inefficiency
of not having the public goods at all would thus be avoided. However,
there would be an — admittedly smaller — inefficiency from excluding people
with low positive valuations even though, with nonrivalry in consumption,
the marginal cost of admitting them to the enjoyment of the public goods
would be zero. The question arises why the excludable public goods should
be financed from distortionary admission fees rather than any other sources
of funds available to the government.
The question is closely related to the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) critique of
the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to indirect taxation and public-sector pric-
ing under a government budget constraint. According to that critique, the
very question addressed in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach is moot if direct
taxation is available to cover the government’s financing needs. In an econ-
omy with homogeneous consumers, there is no reason to rule out lump-sum
Boiteux approach must be replaced by a weighted-elasticities rule when distributive con-
cerns play a role. Cremer et al. (2001, 2003) and Golosov et al. (2003) discuss the use
of indirect taxes for distributive purposes when private-good endowments or savings from
past periods as well as current labour productivities differ across people. Cremer and
Laffont (2003) consider the implications of distributive concerns for public-sector pricing
when people with different incomes also have different costs of accessing the public good
or service.
3 The exception is Bierbrauer (2002).
4 Güth and Hellwig (1986), Rob (1989), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
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taxation as a source of government finance, and a deviation of consumer
prices from marginal costs is undesirable. In an economy with heteroge-
nous consumers having different earning abilities, income taxation suffices
for optimal utilitarian redistribution and government finance. Therefore a
deviation of relative consumer prices from relative marginal costs is again
undesirable, unless nonseparabilities in utility functions generate patterns
of complementarity between consumption goods and leisure so that distor-
tionary indirect taxes and public-sector prices can be used to improve the
equity-efficiency tradeoff which arises from the unobservability of individual
earning abilities.5
The use of admission fees to finance the provision of excludable public
goods is akin to the use of indirect taxes and public-service prices exceed-
ing marginal costs in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach. In principle, therefore,
the Atkinson-Stiglitz critique applies to the Schmitz-Norman model of ex-
cludable public goods as well as to the Ramsey-Boiteux theory of indirect
taxation and public-sector pricing. In both cases, a specific financing require-
ment is subject to the criticism that additional finance would be available
from direct taxation.
However, there is an important difference. Whereas Atkinson and Stiglitz
assume that people differ only with respect to their earning abilities, in the
public-good provision problem, they also differ with respect to their pref-
erences for public versus private goods.6 This difference gives rise to two
objections to the Atkinson-Stiglitz recommendation. First, the use of direct
taxes for public-good finance may violate interim individual-rationality con-
straints. Thus in the large economy with independent private values, the
Atkinson-Stiglitz critique calls for first-best levels of public-goods provision,
financed by equal lump-sum payments from all participants. Participants
who do not care for the public goods at all consider this arrangement to be
worse than one where no public goods are provided and no taxes are levied.
If one has no qualms about the unrestricted use of the government’s power of
coercion, one may not be bothered by this finding. It does, however, require
abandoning the voluntary-exchange approach to public economics that un-
derlay Lindahl’s (1919) creation of the theory of public goods.7 If, instead,
5 Thus, Cremer et al. (2003) and Golosov et al. (2003) find that capital income taxation
can be useful for enhancing the scope for redistribution through labour income taxation.
6 Cremer et al. (2001) have pointed out that Atkinson and Stiglitz rely very heavily
on earning abilities being the only source of heterogeneity. Allowing for heterogeneity in
private-goods endowments, they obtain a rationale for redistributive indirect as well as
direct taxation.
7 The notion that relations between the individual and the state involve a quid pro quo
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one imposes a participation constraint, one is led right back to the analysis of
Schmitz (1997) and Norman (2004) where feasibility requirements and par-
ticipation constraints combine to give rise to a government budget constraint
à la Ramsey-Boiteux. Indeed, for a model with multiple excludable public
goods, Hellwig (2004 a) shows that, if public goods cannot be bundled, the
problem of designing an optimal mechnism for public-goods provision sub-
ject to feasibility and individual rationality constraints is exactly equivalent
to the Ramsey-Boiteux problem for setting optimal admission fees.8
Second, even if one is not worried about participation constraints, the
heterogeneity in public-goods preferences must be taken into account in
utilitarian welfare maximization. Because people with different public-goods
preferences achieve different payoffs, this heterogeneity itself is a source of
distributive concerns. Thus in the Schmitz-Norman model of the provision
of an excludable public good, the people who do not care for the public
good at all have the lowest payoffs. The Atkinson-Stiglitz recommendation
to finance the public good by a lump-sum tax rather than by admission
fees would reduce these people’s payoffs even further while benefiting those
who get a lot of enjoyment out of the public good and are therefore already
better off. If a utilitarian planner is inequality averse, concern about this
distributive effect can justify the use of admission fees rather than lump-
sum taxes. As discussed in Hellwig (2003), the admission fees for excludable
public goods then serve to appropriate some of the benefits of people who
enjoy the public good a lot and to increase the private-good consumption of
people who don’t benefit from the public good at all. In the Rawlsian limit
of infinite inequality aversion, it is actually desirable to set admission fees at
monopoly levels so as to maximize the addition to private-good consumption
of the worst-off people in the economy.
The present paper takes this analysis one step further by integrating the
analysis of public-goods provision with the theory of income taxation. In
a model involving heterogeneity in earning abilities as well as public-goods
preferences, I will study the use of income taxes for both redistribution and
is much older, going back to Grotius and Locke. For an extensive account of the history
of this notion, see Musgrave (1959), pp. 61 - 89. In the present context one may doubt
whether it is appropriate to refer to interim individual rationality rather than ex ante
individual rationality as the concept of voluntariness. Ex ante individual rationality is
problematic if the "real" situation is considered to be one of incomplete information, and
the ex ante stage and common prior are only modelling devices used to make the problem
with incomplete information tractable by turning it into one with imperfect information.
8 However, the allocation induced by an optimal mechanism with bundling may be
superior to the optimal Ramsey-Boiteux allocation; see Fang and Norman (2003), Hellwig
(2004 a).
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public-goods finance, side by side with admission fees for excludable public
goods. Whereas Hellwig (2003) had replaced heterogeneity in earning ability
as a source of distributive concerns by heterogeneity in public-good prefer-
ences, I now look at both dimensions of heterogeneity jointly, developing a
formalism to investigate their respective implications for the use of income
taxes and public-goods admission fees as redistribution devices. I also study
the joint use of income taxation and public-goods admission fees as sources
of public-goods finance when lump-sum taxes are restricted by participation
constraints.
Optimal income taxation and the provision and pricing of public goods
are treated as a matter of Bayesian mechanism design. By a large-numbers
effect, the cross-section distribution of earning abilities and public-goods
preferences is taken to be given and commonly known. However, each per-
son’s individual characteristics are private information of that particular
person. With heterogeneity in earning abilities and in tastes for m public
goods, there are m+1 hidden characteristics, so the information asymmetry
constraining the choice of an allocation or mechanism is inherently multidi-
mensional.
Because of the well-known difficulties of mechanism design with mul-
tidimensional incentive constraints, I am unable to solve the multidimen-
sional mechanism design problem in full generality. Following an approach
pioneered by Hammond (1979, 1987) and Guesnerie (1995), I restrict the
analysis by imposing an additional requirement of renegotiation proofness.
Under this requirement, the final allocation of private goods and of admis-
sion tickets for excludable public goods must not provide participants with
any incentive to engage in side trading out of sight of the mechanism de-
signer. The mechanism designer is assumed to have no control over such side
trading. If the allocation that he stipulates were to leave room for people to
engage in (incentive compatible) Pareto improving trades with each other,
they would use this opportunity and trade to a final allocation where there
would be no further room for such trades. Given that the final allocation
after side trading must be renegotiation proof, the mechanism designer who
cares only about final outcomes may as well restrict his initial choice to
renegotiation proof allocations.
In a large economy, the renegotiation proofness condition is satisfied if
and only if the final allocation of private goods and of admission tickets
for public goods is Walrasian, i.e. supported by a price vector.9 For the
9 In Hellwig (2004 a) this observation is used to show that renegotiation proofness
eliminates the possibility of bundling as well as randomization.
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usual quasi-linear specification of public-goods preferences, it follows that
final holdings of admission tickets for a public good depend only on the
values of the preference parameter for that public good; in particular, they
are independent of earning abilities. In combination with incentive compat-
ibility, this independence property in turn implies that a person’s labour
supply and output provision depend only on the person’s earning ability
and are independent of that person’s public-goods preferences. Given the
latter independence property, incentive constraints for labour supply and
output provision take the same form as in the standard optimal-income-
tax problem. The imposition of renegotiation proofness thus reduces the
m+1-dimensional mechanism design problem to a problem involving m+1
unidimensional incentive constraints, one for each public good and one for
labour supply and output provision. This problem can be handled by stan-
dard methods.
For the second-best utilitarian welfare maximization problem, the analy-
sis shows that, under an affiliation assumption on the distribution of the
hidden characteristics, optimal income taxes and optimal admission fees ex-
hibit the same features as in the corresponding unidimensional problems. In
particular, under positive inequality aversion of the mechanism designer, the
optimal marginal income tax rate is positive in the interior of the domain
of relevant income levels and zero at the boundaries; optimal admission fees
are zero if inequality aversion is small; they are close to profit-maximizing
monopoly prices if inequality aversion is large. The affiliation assumption
admits independence as well as positive correlations, but rules out negative
correlations of the hidden characteristics. Negative correlations might lead
to a situation where people with large earning-ability realizations get so little
pleasure from public goods that the social marginal utility of private-good
consumption of these people is very high and they should be on the receiving
end of private-good redistribution through income taxation. This possibility
is eliminated by the affiliation assumption.
The structure of the conditions characterizing optimal income taxes and
admission fees does not change if, in addition to feasibility and renegotia-
tion proofness, an interim participation constraint is imposed. In terms of
the formalism, the imposition of a participation constraint affects only the
Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility condition. This Lagrange multiplier
goes up and the feasibility constraint is seen to be more stringent because,
when the participation constraint is binding, the implications of, e.g., a re-
duction in an admission fee cannot be neutralized by a lump-sum reduction
in private-good consumption, which would be nondistortionary, but must
be neutralized by a distortionary increase in income taxes or in another ad-
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mission fee. However, this is the only change induced by the imposition of
interim individual rationality.
In the absence of inequality aversion, the mechanism design problem
with interim individual rationality is equivalent to a generalized version of
the Ramsey-Boiteux problem. In this generalized version, revenues from
nonlinear income taxes, as well as admission fees, are used for public-goods
finance. If participation constraints are binding, the optimal marginal in-
come tax is positive even at the bottom of the income distribution. Oth-
erwise the formalism for the optimal nonlinear income tax is the same in
the Generalized Ramsey-Boiteux Problem as in the utilitarian approach of
Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and Seade (1977, 1982) or in the utilitarian model
without participation constraints.
Optimal admission fees satisfy a version of the inverse-elasticities rule; if
the mechanism designer is inequality averse, the inverse-elasticities rule is re-
placed by a weighted-inverse-elasticities rule à la Diamond-Mirrlees (1971).
The form of this rule is again independent of whether participation con-
straints are imposed or not. Similarly, the difference between utilitarian
welfare maximization and the Generalized Ramsey Boiteux Problem, is not
relevant for the validity of the Mirrlees-Seade characterization of optimal
income taxes and of the weighted-inverse-elasticities characterization of op-
timal admission fees.
In the following, Section 2 lays out the basic model, explaining the re-
quirements of incentive compatibility, renegotiation proofness and feasibility
and showing how renegotiation proofness and incentive compatibility to-
gether turn the m+1-dimensional mechanism design problem into one that
has m+ 1 unidimensional incentive constraints.
Section 3 studies optimal allocations. Section 3.1 characterizes first-
best, i.e., optimal feasible allocations allocations. Section 3.2 character-
izes second-best allocations, i.e., optimal incentive compatible, renegotia-
tion proof and feasible allocations when the mechanism designer is inequal-
ity averse. The implications of imposing interim individual rationality are
considered in Section 3.3. All proofs are given in the appendix.
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2 A Model with Multiple Public Goods and Het-
erogeneous Labour
2.1 The Basic Model
I study a large economy with one private good, m public goods and labour.
Some of the public goods are excludable, some may be nonexcludable. The
sets of excludable and nonexcludable public goods are denoted as Je and
Jne. For each individual h in the economy, an allocation must determine how
much of the private good the individual gets to consume, which public goods
he is admitted to and how much labour input he provides. Let Q1, ..., Qm
be the levels at which public goods 1, ...,m are provided. Individual h with
taste parameters θhi , i = 1, ...,m, obtains the utility
ch +
∑
i∈Jh
θhiQi − ℓ
h. (2.1)
if he has private-good consumption ch, if he is admitted to the enjoyment
of public goods i ∈ Jh, and if he provides the labour input ℓh.
The labour input ℓh serves to produce an output yh = ϕ(ℓh, nh), where
nh is a productivity parameter pertaining to h. It is actually more convenient
to think of ℓh and yh in terms of the output yh and the associated input
requirement
ℓh = γ(yh, nh), (2.2)
where, γ(., nh) is the inverse of the production function ϕ(., nh). In this no-
tation, participant h with taste parameters θhi , i = 1, ...,m, and productivity
parameter nh obtains the utility
ch +
∑
i∈Jh
θhiQi − γ(y
h, nh) (2.3)
if he has private-good consumption ch, if he is admitted to the enjoy-
ment of public goods i ∈ Jh, and if he provides the output yh. The func-
tion γ is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing and
strictly convex in yh as well as nonincreasing in nh. Moreover, γ(0, nh) = 0,
limyh↓0 γy(y
h, nh) = 0 for all nh, and γyn(y
h, nh) < 0 for all yh and nh.
The productivity parameter nh and the vector θh = (θh1 , ..., θ
h
m) of pref-
erence parameters are the realizations of random variables n˜h and θ˜
h
taking
values in [0, 1] and [0, 1]m, which are defined on some underlying probability
space (Ω,F , P ). The joint distribution F (.) of n˜h and θ˜
h
is assumed to
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be the same for all agents. Moreover, F has a strictly positive, continu-
ously differentiable density f(.). The marginal distributions of n˜h and θ˜
h
i ,
i = 1, ...,m, are denoted as Fn and F i, their densities as fn and f i.
The set of participants is modelled as an atomless measure space (H,H, η).
I assume that the random variables (n˜h, θ˜
h
), h ∈ H, are independent and
that, by a large-numbers effect, with probability one, the probability dis-
tribution F can be taken to be the cross-section distribution of the pair
(n˜h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω)) in the population. Thus, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, I write
1
η(H)
∫
H
ϕ(n˜h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω))dη(h) =
∫
[0,1]m+1
ϕ(n,θ)dF (n,θ) (2.4)
for every F -integrable function ϕ from [0, 1]m+1 into ℜ.10
I restrict the analysis to allocations that satisfy an ex-ante neutrality or
anonymity condition. The level ch of an individual’s private-good consump-
tion, the set Jh of public goods to which the individual is admitted, and the
level yh of output that the individual provides are assumed to depend on h
and on the state of the world x only through the realizations n˜h(ω) = nh
and θ˜
h
(ω) = θh of the random variables n˜h and θ˜
h
. In principle, ch, Jh and
yh should also depend on the cross-section distribution of the other agents’
parameter realizations n˜h
′
(ω) = nh
′
and θ˜
h′
(ω) = θh
′
in the population,
but because this cross-section distribution is constant and independent of
ω, there is no need to make this dependence explicit. This is a major advan-
tage of working with the large-economy specification with the law of large
numbers.
An allocation is thus defined as an array
A = (QA, cA(., .), yA(., .), χA1 (., .), ..., χ
A
m(., .)), (2.5)
such that QA = (QA1 , ...,Q
A
m) is a vector of public-good provision levels,
and cA(., .), yA(., .), χA1 (., .), ..., χ
A
m(., .) are functions which stipulate for each
(n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, a level cA(n,θ) of private-good consumption, a level
yA(n,θ) of output provision and indicators χAi (n,θ) for admission to pub-
lic goods i = 1, ...,m, to be applied to any participant h in the state ω if
(n˜h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω)) = (n,θ). The indicator χAi (n,θ) takes value one if the con-
sumer is admitted and value zero, if he is not admitted to public good i.
10 As discussed by Judd (1985), the law-of-large-numbers property (2.4) is consistent
with, though not implied by stochastic independence of the random pairs (n˜h, θ˜
h
), h ∈ H.
For a large-economy specification with independence in which the law of large numbers
holds as a theorem, see Al-Najjar (2004).
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Through (2.2), the output level yA(n,θ) also determines a labour input level
ℓA(n,θ) = γ(yA(n,θ), n).
Allocations are assessed according to the cross-section distribution of
utility which they induce, according to the utilitarian welfare functional
1
η(H)
∫
H
W
(
cA(n˜h, θ˜
h
) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n˜
h, θ˜
h
)θ˜
h
iQ
A
i − γ(y
A(n˜h, θ˜
h
), n˜h)
)
dη(h),
which under (2.4) is almost surely equal to∫
[0,1]m+1
W
(
cA(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n,θ)θiQ
A
i − γ(y
A(n,θ), n)
)
dF (n,θ).
(2.6)
The function W (.) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly
increasing, and concave. If W (.) is affine, i.e. if W ′′(v) = 0 for all v, the
welfare functional (2.6) is ordinally equivalent to the aggregate surplus∫
[0,1]m+1
[cA(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n,θ)θiQ
A
i − γ(y
A(n,θ), n)] dF (n,θ). (2.7)
In this case, the cross-section dispersion of utility levels is of no concern.
In contrast, if W (.) is strictly concave, the mechanism designer is inequality
averse and would like to use the assigment of private-good consumption
to reduce the cross-section dispersion of utility levels. Following Atkinson
(1973), I refer to the relative curvature ρW (v) = −
W ′′(v)
W ′(v) as a measure of
inequality aversion.
The mechanism design problem will be to choose an allocation that max-
imizes the welfare functional (2.6) over the set of admissible allocations.
Admissibility will be defined with reference to incentive compatibility, rene-
gotiation proofness, feasibility and, in the last part of the paper, individual
rationality. In the following, I explain these requirements.
2.2 Incentive Compatibility
Each participant h ∈ H knows the realizations nh and θh of his own pro-
ductivity and preference parameters, and hence the payoff
vA(nh,θh) := cA(nh,θh) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n
h,θh)θhiQ
A
i − γ(y
A(nh,θh), nh) (2.8)
that he obtains from an allocation A.
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The information about nh and θh is private. Apart from the distribu-
tion F , nobody knows anything about the pair (n˜, θ˜) pertaining to some-
body else. Following Mirrlees (1971) and the subsequent literature, I also
assume that labour inputs are unobservable. Therefore there is nothing
to prevent a participant with productivity and preference parameters n, θ
from claiming to have parameters n′, θ′ in order to obtain the private-good
consumption cA(n′,θ′) as well as public-goods admissions according to the
indicators χAi (n
′,θ′) while producing the output y(n′,θ′) with the labour
input γ(y(n′,θ′), n). An allocation A is said to be incentive compatible if
the participant has nothing to gain from such a claim, i.e. if and only if
vA(n,θ) ≥ cA(n′,θ′) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n
′,θ′)θiQ
A
i − γ(y
A(n′,θ′), n) (2.9)
for all (n,θ) and (n′,θ′) in [0, 1]m+1.
A characterization of incentive compatible allocations is beyond the
scope of this paper. As discussed by Rochet and Choné (1998), the fact
that the incentive problem is multidimensional and that the payoff function
(2.8) is not affine in n makes it all but imposible to find a simple character-
ization.
2.3 Renegotiation Proofness
In addition to incentive compatibility, I impose a condition of renegotiation
proofness. The mechanism designer is assumed to be unable to verify the
identities of people who present tickets for being admitted to the enjoyment
of a public good. In particular, he is unable to check whether the people who
present tickets for admission to a public good are in fact the same people
to whom the tickets have been issued. As in Hammond (1979, 1987) and
Guesnerie (1995), he is also unable to prevent people from trading admission
tickets and the private good among each other. If the initial allocation of
tickets leaves room for a Pareto improvement through such trading, then, as
discussed by Hammond and Guesnerie, in the absence of transactions costs,
such trading will occur, and the initial allocation will not actually be the
final allocation.
Imposition of renegotiation proofness in this setting corresponds to the
idea that, regardless of the allocation that is initially chosen by the mech-
anism designer, in the absence of transactions costs, any allocation that is
finally implemented must itself be renegotiation proof. If the mechanism
designer is aware of the possibility of renegotiation and if he cares about the
12
allocation that is finally implemented rather than the one that is initially
chosen, his choice may be directly expressed in terms of the final renegoti-
ation proof allocation. Indeed if he chooses a renegotiation proof allocation
from the beginning, this initial allocation will also be the final allocation.
For a formal treatment, I introduce the concept of a net-trade alloca-
tion for private-good consumption and public-good admission tickets as
an array (zc(., .), z1(., .), .., zm(., .)) such that for each (n,θ), zc(n,θ) and
z1(n,θ), .., zm(n,θ) are the net additions to private-good consumption and
admission ticket holdings for public goods of a consumer with productiv-
ity parameter n and preference parameter vector θ. Given an initial al-
location A, a net-trade allocation (zc(., .), z1(., .), .., zm(., .)) is feasible if
χAi (n,θ) + zi(n,θ) ∈ {0, 1} for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]
m+1 and, moreover,∫
H
zi(n˜
h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω))dη(h) = 0 (2.10)
for i = c, 1, ...,m and almost all ω ∈ Ω, which by (2.4) is equivalent to the
requirement that ∫
[0,1]m+1
zi(n,θ)dF (n,θ) = 0 (2.11)
for i = c, 1, ...,m.11 GivenA, the net-trade allocation (zc(., .), z1(., .), .., zm(., .))
is incentive compatible if
zc(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
zi(n,θ)θiQ
A
i ≥ zc(n,θ
′) +
m∑
i=1
zi(n,θ
′)θiQ
A
i (2.12)
for all (n,θ) and (n′,θ′) in [0, 1]m+1 for which χi(n,θ) + zi(n
′,θ′) ∈ {0, 1}
for all i. The idea is that the holdings (cA(n,θ), χA1 (n,θ), ..., χ
A
m(n,θ)) of
private-good consumption and public-goods admission tickets of a given
agent as well as the realization (n,θ) of (n˜, θ˜) are not known by anybody
else.12 Therefore, if the agent claims that the realization of (n˜, θ˜) is (n′,θ′),
11 In this first approach, I omit the requirement that private-good consumption must
not be negative. This device eliminates the interdependence of labour input provision and
public-good consumption that arises when people with low labour incomes are unable to
pay for the admission tickets to the public goods. This interdependence will be the subject
of another study.
12 One might argue that the mechanism designer knows the consumer’s actual holdings,
and therefore the incentive constraints may be loosened. Such loosening of incentive
constraints would tend to enhance the scope for renegotiations and make the condition
of renegotiation proofness even more restrictive. In the large economy considered here, it
does not actually make a difference because the characterization of renegotiation proofness
in Lemma 2.2 remains valid. In a finite economy, there would be a difference.
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he obtains the net trade (zAc (n
′,θ′), zA1 (n
′,θ′), ..., zAm(n
′,θ′)) that is available
to an agent with parameters n′, θ′. Incentive compatibility of the net-trade
allocation requires that such a claim must not provide the agent with an
improvement over the stipulated net trade (zc(n,θ), z1(n,θ), ..., zm(n,θ)).
An allocation A is said to be renegotiation proof if, starting from A, there
is no feasible and incentive compatible net-trade allocation which provides
a Pareto improvement in the sense that for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, the utility
gain from the net trade (zc(n,θ), z1(n,θ), ..., zm(n,θ)) is nonnegative, i.e.
zc(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
zi(n,θ)θiQ
A
i ≥ 0, (2.13)
and the aggregate utility gain is strictly positive, i.e.∫
[0,1]m+1
[zc(n˜
h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω)) +
m∑
i=1
zi(n˜
h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω))θ˜
h
i (ω)Q
A
i ] dF (n,θ) > 0,
(2.14)
with positive probability; by (2.4), the latter inequality is equivalent to the
inequality ∫
[0,1]m+1
[zc(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
zi(n,θ)θiQ
A
i ] dF (n,θ) > 0, (2.15)
which actually implies that (2.14) holds with probability one.
The following lemma shows that an allocation is renegotiation proof if
and only if there exists a price system which supports the allocation as
a competitive equilibrium of the exchange economy in which people trade
the private good as well as admission tickets for the different public goods,
taking the vector QA of public-good provision levels as given.
Lemma 2.1 An allocation A is renegotiation proof if and only if there exist
prices pA1 , ...p
A
m such that for i = 1, ...,m, and almost all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]
m+1,
one has
χAi (n,θ) = 0 if θiQ
A
i < p
A
i (2.16)
and
χAi (n,θ) = 1 if θiQ
A
i > p
A
i . (2.17)
Renegotiation proofness implies, for each public good i, a simple division
between participants with high θi and participants with low θi. The former
get admission to public good i with probability one; the latter do not get
admission to public good i at all.
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2.4 Using Renegotiation Proofness to Decompose Incentive
Compatibility
The prices pA1 , ...p
A
m in Lemma 2.1 can be interpreted as admission fees. If
the allocation is incentive compatible, as well as renegotiation proof, it must
be the case that admission to public good i is granted if and only if the
person in question surrenders pAi units of private-good consumption. Then
agents with θiQ
A
i > p
A
i pay the fee and enjoy the public good for a net
benefit equal to θiQ
A
i − p
A
i ; agents with θiQ
A
i < p
A
i do not pay the fee and
are excluded from the public good. Thus one obtains:
Lemma 2.2 If A is a renegotiation proof and incentive compatible alloca-
tion with associated prices pA1 , ...p
A
m, then the expected-payoff function v
A(.)
takes the form
vA(n, θ1, ..., θm) = v¯
A(n) +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0). (2.18)
Moreover, for any (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, the admission indicators χAi (n,θ) sat-
isfy
χAi (n,θ) = χ¯
A
i (θi), (2.19)
for i = 1...,m, where
χ¯Ai (θi) = 0 if θiQ
A
i < p
A
i and χ¯
A
i (θi) = 1 if θiQ
A
i > p
A
i . (2.20)
In an allocation that is renegotiation proof and incentive compatible,
the admission of a person to any one public good i depends only on the per-
son’s preference parameter θi for that particular public good. The person’s
productivity parameter n and the preference parameters θj for public goods
j 
= i do not affect the admission to public good i. Admissions decisions
for the different public goods are thus separated from each other and from
decisions on labour inputs and production.
Given that χAi (n,θ) satisfies (2.20), the contribution of public-goods
enjoyment to the expected payoff vA(n, θ1, ..., θm) is entirely captured by
the surplus
∑m
i=1max(θiQ
A
i −p
A
i , 0). The difference between v
A(n, θ1, ..., θm)
and the surplus
∑m
i=1max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0) does not depend on the preference
parameters θ1, ..., θm. This difference can be written as
v¯A(n) = cA0 (n,θ)− γ(y
A(n,θ), n), (2.21)
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where
cA0 (n,θ) = c
A(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
χAi (n,θ) p
A
i . (2.22)
Conceptually, v¯A(n) is the payoff that an individual with characteristics
n,θ obtains from working the amount γ(yA(n,θ), n) and consuming the
amount cA0 (n,θ) of the private good without purchasing admission to any
of the public goods. Lemma 2.2 indicates that under a renegotiation proof
and incentive compatible allocation this payoff is independent of θ.
The following proposition uses this independence property to show that
cA0 (n,θ) and y
A(n,θ) in turn must be independent of θ. There is thus no
direct interdependence between the admissions to different public goods i
and j or between the admission to some public good i and the provision of
labour. The m+ 1−dimensional mechanism design problem is transformed
into a problem involving m+ 1 unidimensional incentive constraints.
Proposition 2.3 An allocation A is renegotiation proof and incentive com-
patible if and only if there exist prices pA1 , ...p
A
m and functions cˆ
A(.), yˆA(.),
v¯A(.) from [0, 1] into ℜ+ such that the following conditions hold:
(a) the expected payoff function vA(.) and the admission indicators χAi (n,θ),
i = 1...,m, satisfy (2.18) - (2.20);
(b) for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1,
cA0 (n,θ) = cˆ
A(n) and yA(n,θ) = yˆA(n), (2.23)
cˆA(n) = v¯A(n) + γ(yˆA(n), n), (2.24)
and
v¯A(n) ≥ v¯A(nˆ) + γ(yˆA(nˆ), nˆ)− γ(yˆA(nˆ), n) (2.25)
for all nˆ ∈ [0, 1].
The proof of this result in the appendix involves two steps. The first
step uses Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 to show that an allocation is renegotiation
proof and incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies statement (a) and
the incentive constraint
v¯A(n) ≥ v¯A(nˆ) + γ(yA(nˆ,θ), nˆ)− γ(yA(nˆ,θ), n) (2.26)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1 and all nˆ ∈ [0, 1]. The second step uses (2.26) to
prove that yA(n,θ) must be independent of θ. For any given θ, (2.26) is
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exactly the incentive compatibility condition for the unidimensional optimal-
income tax problem studied by Mirrlees (1971, 1976). By standard argu-
ments, it follows that v¯A(.) satisfies the differential equation
dv¯A
dn
(n) = −γn(y
A(n,θ), n) (2.27)
for almost all n and all θ. Because the left-hand side of (2.27) is indepen-
dent of θ and because γny < 0, equation (2.27) implies that y
A(n,θ) is
independent of θ, which is the point of (2.23).
Given that (2.25) is a unidimensional incentive compatibility condition
and given the assumption that γny < 0, the results of Mirrlees (1976) yield:
Remark 2.4 The incentive compatibility condition (2.25) holds for all n and
nˆ if and only if the function v¯A(.) takes the form
v¯A(n) = v¯A(0)−
∫ n
0
γn(yˆ
A(n′), n′)dn′ (2.28)
and the functions cˆA(.) and yˆA(.) are nondecreasing.13
2.5 Feasibility and the Government Budget Constraint
For any Q ∈ ℜm+ , let K(Q) be the aggregate amount of private-good con-
sumption per capita that has to be foregone for the vector Q of public-good
provision levels. The cost function K(.) is assumed to be strictly increas-
ing, strictly convex and twice continuously differentiable, with K(0) = 0
and with partial derivatives Ki(.) satisfying limk→∞Ki(Q
k) = 0 for any
sequence {Qk} with limk→∞Q
k
i = 0 and limk→∞Ki(Q
k) = ∞ for any se-
quence {Qk} with limk→∞Q
k
i =∞.
An allocation A is said to be feasible if it satisfies
χAi (n,θ) = 1 (2.29)
for i ∈ Jne and all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, and
1
η(H)
∫
H
cA(n˜h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω))dη(h)+K(QA) ≤
1
η(H)
∫
H
yA(n˜h(ω), θ˜
h
(ω))dη(h)
(2.30)
13 By (2.28) and the monotonicity of yˆA(.), monotonicity of cˆA(.) is gratuitous.
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for almost all ω ∈ Ω, so that the sum of aggregate consumption and public-
good provision costs does not exceed aggregate output. By (2.4), (2.30) is
equivalent to the requirement that
∫
[0,1]m+1
cA(n,θ)dF (n,θ) +K(QA) ≤
∫
[0,1]m+1
yA(n,θ)dF (n,θ). (2.31)
For a renegotiation proof and incentive compatible allocation, Proposi-
tion 2.3 implies that (2.29) and (2.31) take the form
pAi = 0 for i ∈ J
ne (2.32)
and
K(QA) ≤
∫ 1
0
[yˆA(n)− cˆ(n)] dFn(n) +
m∑
i=1
pAi (1− F
i(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ))), (2.33)
where, for any i,
θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ) :=
pAi
QAi
if QAi > 0, and θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ) := 1 if Q
A
i = 0. (2.34)
In view of (2.20), θˆi(pAi , Q
A
i ) is defined so that χi(n, θ) = 0 whenever θi <
θˆi(pAi ,Q
A
i ), and χi(n, θ) = 1 whenever θi ∈ (θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ), 1].
The second term on the right-hand side of (2.33) corresponds to ag-
gregate revenues from admission fees. Given the fees pA1 , ..., p
A
m, for any i,
there are (1 − F i(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i )) participants asking for admission to public
good i. Aggregate admission fee revenue from public good i is therefore
pAi (1− F
i(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i )), which is positive if p
A
i ∈ (0, Q
A
i ) and zero if p
A
i = 0,
in particular if the public good is nonexcludable. Aggregate admission fee
revenue from all public goods is obtained by summing over all i = 1, ...,m.
The first term on the right-hand side of (2.33) corresponds to net aggre-
gate revenue from direct taxation. By the well known taxation principle,
this term can be written as a function of the output yˆA(n) and can be
interpreted as an income tax.
Remark 2.5 If the allocation A is renegotiation proof and incentive com-
patible, there exists a function TA : ℜ+ → ℜ such that, for any n,
yˆA(n)− cˆ(n) = TA(yˆA(n)), (2.35)
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and (2.33) takes the form
K(QA) ≤
∫ 1
0
TA(yˆA(n)) dFn(n) +
m∑
i=1
pAi (1− F
i(θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ))). (2.36)
For almost every n ∈ [0, 1], the derivative of TA(.) at the point yˆA(n) is well
defined and satisfies
dTA
dy
(yˆA(n)) = 1− γy(yˆ
A(n), n). (2.37)
The feasibility constraint thus takes the form of a government budget
constraint requiring that the cost K(QA) of public-goods provision be cov-
ered by the sum of total revenues from income taxes and from admission
fees for public goods. If net aggregate revenue from direct taxation is neg-
ative, e.g., because, for low values of n, the mechanism designer is provid-
ing a subsidy rather than imposing a tax, then the net aggregate subsidy
−
∫ 1
0 T
A(yˆA(n)) dFn(n) must not exceed the surplus of admission fee rev-
enues over the costs of public-goods provision.
3 Welfare Maximizing Allocations
3.1 First-Best Allocations
Turning to the analysis of welfare-maximizing allocations, I begin with first-
best allocations, i.e. allocations which maximize (2.6) over the set of feasible
allocations, without regard for renegotiation proofness and incentive com-
patibility. By standard arguments, one obtains:
Proposition 3.1 Let y∗ : [0, 1]→ ℜ+ and Q
∗ ∈ ℜm+ be such that
γy(y
∗(n), n) = 1 (3.1)
for all n and ∫ 1
0
θidF
i(θi) = Ki(Q
∗) (3.2)
for i = 1, ...,m. An allocation A is first-best if and only if it satisfies the
feasibility condition (2.31) with equality as well as QA = Q∗, and
yA(n,θ) = y∗(n), (3.3)
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χAi (n,θ) = 1, (3.4)
and, for some λ > 0,
W ′
(
cA(n,θ) +
m∑
i=1
θiQ
∗
i − γ(y
∗(n), n)
)
= λ, (3.5)
for almost all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1.
Under the given assumptions about the cost functions γ and K, first-
best levels of public-good provision and of output provision by individuals
are unique and are strictly positive. The ability to exclude people from the
enjoyment of a public good is never utilized. First-best levels of public-good
provision are chosen so that for each i, the marginal cost Ki(QA) of increas-
ing Qi is equal to the aggregate marginal benefit that consumers draw from
the increase; this is the well-known Lindahl-Samuelson condition. First-
best output levels depend only on the individuals’ productivity parameters;
output provision is driven to the point where marginal cost is equal to one.
Social marginal benefits of consumption are equalized across partici-
pants. If the welfare function W is strictly concave, this implies that, for
some constant c∗0, one has
cA(n,θ) = c∗0 + γ(y
∗(n), n)−
m∑
i=1
θiQ
∗
i (3.6)
for almost all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, so the dependence of private-good con-
sumption on n and θ is used to compensate for output provision costs and
public-goods enjoyment, with the consequence that vA(n,θ) = c∗0, regardless
of n and θ.
In combination with (3.4), equation (3.6) is incompatible with incentive
compatibility: By (3.4) and Lemma 2.1, a first-best allocation is renego-
tiation proof. By Lemma 2.2 therefore, incentive compatibility is violated
if cA(n,θ) depends on θ as shown in (3.6). Proposition 3.1 thus has the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.2 If the welfare function W is strictly concave, a first-best
allocation is not incentive compatible.
In contrast, if the welfare function W is affine, condition (3.5) has no
bite. In this case, Proposition 3.1 yields:
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Corollary 3.3 If the welfare function W is affine, a first-best allocation is
incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies
cA(n,θ) = y∗(n)−K(Q∗). (3.7)
for all (n,θ), QA = Q∗, yA(n,θ) = y∗(n) for all n and χAi (n,θ) = 1.
In the absence of inequality aversion, a first-best allocation is imple-
mented by levying the lump-sum tax K(Q∗) on everybody; in this case,
optimal admission fees and marginal income tax rates are equal to zero.
3.2 Second-Best Allocations
This section considers second-best allocations, defined as those allocations
which maximize the welfare functional (2.6) over the set of all feasible,
incentive compatible and renegotiation proof allocations. By Proposition
2.3 and Remark 2.4, the problem of choosing a second-best allocation is
equivalent to the problem of choosing public-goods provision levels QAi for
i = 1, ...,m, admission prices pAi for i ∈ J
e, an expected-payoff function
v¯A(.) and nondecreasing functions cˆA(.), yˆA(.) so as to maximize∫
[0,1]m+1
W
(
v¯A(n) +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0)
)
dF (n,θ) (3.8)
subject to the feasibility constraint
K(QA1 , ...,Q
A
m) ≤
∫ 1
0
[yˆA(n)− cˆA(n)]dFn(n) +
m∑
i=1
pAi (1− F
i(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i )))
(3.9)
and the conditions that pAi = 0 for i ∈ J
ne, and, for any n ∈ [0, 1],
cˆA(n) = v¯A(n) + γ(yˆA(n), n) (3.10)
and
v¯A(n) = v¯A(0)−
∫ n
0
γn(yˆ
A(n′), n′)dn′. (3.11)
Solutions to the latter problem are characterized by standard techniques.
The following proposition indicates the first-order necessary conditions for
a maximum.
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Proposition 3.4 Let A be a second-best allocation, let pA1 , ...p
A
m be the as-
sociated admissions prices, let cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.) be the associated consump-
tion, output provision and payoff functions, and let
λ :=
∫
[0,1]m+1
W ′(vA(n,θ)) dF (n,θ). (3.12)
Then, for any nonexcludable public good i ∈ Jne,∫
[0,1]m+1
W ′(vA(n,θ)) θi dF (n,θ) = λKi(Q
A). (3.13)
For any excludable public good i ∈ Je,∫
[0,1]m+1
W ′(vA(n,θ)) max(θi−θˆ
A
i , 0) dF (n,θ)+λθˆ
A
i (1−F
i(θˆ
A
i )) = λKi(Q
A)
(3.14)
and
λ (1− F i(θˆ
A
i )− θˆ
A
i f
i(θˆ
A
i ))−
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]m
W ′(vA(n,θ)) dF (n,θ) = 0, (3.15)
where θˆ
A
i := θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ), as defined in (2.34).
Moreover, for any n ∈ [0, 1],∫ 1
n
[
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)
]
dn′ ≥ 0, (3.16)
where ψA(.) is an absolutely continuous function satisfying
ψA(n) =
∫ 1
n
∫
[0,1]m
(W ′(vA(n,θ))− λ)dF (n′,θ) (3.17)
for all n. If the inequality in (3.16) is strict, then yˆA(.) is constant on some
open neighbourhood of n. If yˆA(.) is strictly increasing at n, (3.16) holds as
an equation; therefore,
λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n), n))fn(n) = γny(yˆ
A(n), n)ψA(n) (3.18)
if, on some open neighbourhood of n, the monotonicity constraint on cˆA(.),
yˆA(.) is not binding.
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Because renegotiation proofness has reduced the general m+1-dimensional
mechanism design problem to a problem with m+ 1 unidimensional incen-
tive constraints, the first-order conditions for a second-best allocation have
the same structure as the corresponding conditions in the unidimensional
utilitarian public-good provision problem and the unidimensional utilitar-
ian income tax problem.14 The multidimensional nature of the problem does
however appear in the term W ′(vA(n,θ)) in (3.12) - (3.15) and (3.17). This
term indicates the marginal social welfare attached to an additional unit of
private-good consumption for a person with productivity and taste parame-
ters n and θ1, ...θm. It depends in a nontrivial way on all these parameters.
(3.13) - (3.15) therefore require taking expectations with respect to n and
θ−i, i.e. those parameters which are not directly relevant for public good i;
similarly, (3.17) involves taking expectations with respect to the vector θ of
those parameters which are not directly relevant for labour-leisure choices.
If the different parameters are mutually independent, i.e. if F takes the form
of a product Fn×F 1×...×Fm, this integration has no effect on the underly-
ing tradeoffs, and the first-order conditions have exactly the same structure
as in the corresponding unidimensional problems. However, if the different
parameters are not independent, the correlations can affect the underlying
tradeoffs.
To see why, consider the standard argument for the positivity of the
optimal marginal income tax rate at yˆA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1). By Remark
2.5, the optimal marginal income tax rate at yˆA(n) is strictly positive if
γy(yˆ
A(n), n) < 1. Under the assumption that W is strictly concave, Mirrlees
(1971, 1976) and Seade (1977, 1982) derive this result from (3.18) and the
observation that the costate variable ψA(n) is negative for n ∈ (0, 1). Nega-
tivity of ψA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1) is obtained from the unidimensional analogues
of (3.12) and (3.17) in combination with the observation that W ′(v¯A(n)) is
strictly decreasing in n.15 In the multidimensional setting considered here,
the negativity of ψA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1) does not follow so easily: Rewrite
14 For the unidimensional utilitarian public-good provision problem, see Hellwig (2003);
for the utilitarian income tax problem, Hellwig (2004 b). Conditions (3.18) and (3.17)
are essentially the conditions of Mirrlees (1971, 1976) and Seade (1977, 1982) for the case
where the monotonicity constraint is not binding. (3.16) generalizes the condition of Ebert
(1992) and Brunner (1993), to allow for the possibility that yˆA(.) may not be continuous,
let alone piecewise continuously differentiable.
15 The latter observation follows from strict concavity of W (.) in combination with the
fact that incentive compatibility implies strict monotonicity of v¯A(.).
23
(3.17) in the form
ψA(n) =
∫ 1
n
[∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n′,θ)
)
dF (θ|n′)− λ
]
dFn(n′), (3.19)
where F (.|n′) is the conditional distribution of θ˜ given n˜ = n′. The usual
argument for the negativity of ψA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1) is valid if the function
n′ →
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n′,θ)
)
dF (θ|n′) (3.20)
is decreasing. However, this monotonicity property is not ensured merely
by the monotonicity of the integrand. If the productivity parameter were
negatively correlated with the taste parameters, the dependence of the con-
ditional distribution F (.|n′) on n′ could outweigh the monotonicity of the
integrand, at least locally.
Monotonicity of (3.20) and negativity of ψA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1) are ensured
if productivity and taste parameters are independent or if they are positively
correlated. The appropriate notion of positive correlation here is provided
by the concept of affiliation. As defined in Milgrom and Weber (1982), the
random variables n˜, θ˜1, ..., θ˜m are affiliated if and only if their joint density
f satisfies the inequality
f((n,θ) ∨ (n′,θ′)) · f((n,θ) ∧ (n′,θ′)) ≥ f((n,θ)) · f((n′,θ′))
for all (n,θ) and (n′,θ′) in [0, 1]m+1, where (n,θ)∨(n′,θ′) and (n,θ)∧(n′,θ′)
refer to the vectors of component-wise maxima and component-wise minima
of (n,θ) and (n′,θ′).
Proposition 3.5 Let A be a second-best allocation, with associated con-
sumption, output provision and payoff functions cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.). If the
productivity and taste parameters are affiliated and if the welfare function
W is strictly concave, then γy(yˆ
A(n), n) < 1 and yˆA(n) < y∗(n) for all
n ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, limn↑1 γy(yˆ
A(n), n) = 1 and limn↑1 yˆ
A(n) = y∗(1). If
the monotonicity constraint on yˆA(.) is nonbinding in a neighbourhood of
zero, limn↓0 γy(yˆ
A(n), n) = 1 and limn↓0 yˆ
A(n) = y∗(0).
Corollary 3.6 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.5, the optimal mar-
ginal income tax is positive at yˆA(n) for n ∈ (0, 1), zero at limn↑1 yˆ
A(n) and
zero at limn↓0 yˆ
A(n) unless the monotonicity constraint on yˆA(.) is binding
in a neighbourhood of zero.
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The first-order conditions (3.13) and (3.14) for public-goods provision
levels correspond to a modified Lindahl-Samuelson condition. For a nonex-
cludable public good, QAi is determined in such a way that the marginal
provision cost is equal to a marginal-welfare-weighted aggregate of the mar-
ginal benefits that consumers draw from an increase in QAi . For an exclud-
able public good, the marginal provision cost is equated to the sum of the
marginal-welfare-weighted aggregate of the marginal benefits that are ob-
tained by users and the aggregate marginal revenues that are obtained by
the mechanism designer if the admission fee pAi is raised in proportion to
QAi so that the critical θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ) is unchanged.
Under the affiliation assumption, the total marginal benefits of an in-
crease in QAi are in both cases less than
∫ 1
0 θidF
i(θi), the total marginal
benefit of an increase in QAi in a first-best setting. If the cost function
K is additively separable, it follows that second-best levels of public-goods
provision are lower than first-best levels.
For a nonexcludable public good, the difference is due to the negative
correlation between the taste parameter θ˜i and the conditional expectation,
given θi, of the marginal welfare weight W
′; this negative correlation im-
plies that high values of the taste parameter receive relatively less weight.
If n˜, θ˜1, ..., θ˜m are independent, the negative correlation reflects the mecha-
nism designer’s aversion against inequality of payoffs induced by differences
in θi; this effect has been discussed in Hellwig (2003). If n˜, θ˜1, ..., θ˜m are pos-
itively correlated, the negative correlation between θ˜i and W
′ also reflects
the mechanism designer’s aversion against inequality of payoffs induced by
differences in earning abilities, as in Boadway and Keen (1993).16
For an excludable public good, the difference between the conditions for
second-best and first-best public-goods provision is also due to the fact that
there are fewer users of the public good than in the first-best allocation.
Moreover, the mechanism designer is unable to fully appropriate the ben-
efits from additional public-good provision so aggregate marginal revenues
accruing to him are less than aggregate marginal benefits accruing to users.
From these considerations, one obtains:
16 In the present model, with additively separable payoffs, correlations between the pa-
rameters n˜, θ˜1, ..., θ˜m take the place of nonseparabilities in Boadway and Keen (1993).
Independence of n˜, θ˜1, ..., θ˜m corresponds to the separable specifications in Boadway and
Keen (1993), as well as Christiansen (1981). In contrast to their results, independence
here does not yield first-best provision levels because of the combination of nondegeneracy
of θ˜
h
i and inequality aversion. Independence would yield first-best provision levels if the
mechanism designer was able to observe the realizations of θ˜
h
i .
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Proposition 3.7 Let A be a second-best allocation. If the productivity and
taste parameters are affiliated and if the welfare function W is strictly con-
cave, the vector QA of public-goods provision levels satisfies QA >> 0 and∫ 1
0
θidF
i(θi) > Ki(Q
A)
for i = 1, ..,m. If K(.) is additively separable, second-best public-goods pro-
vision levels are strictly less than their first-best counterparts.
As for the admission fees pAi for i ∈ J
e, an increase in pAi reduces the
private-good consumption of people with θi > θˆ
A
i who are paying the higher
fee while at the same time raising admission fee revenues and permitting an
equal increase in everybody’s private-good consumption. Condition (3.15)
balances these two effects at the margin. Upon rewriting this condition in
the form
θˆ
A
i f
i(θˆ
A
i )) = λ (1− F
i(θˆ
A
i ))−
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ)(3.21)
=
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
[
λ−
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ−i|θi)
]
dF i(θi),(3.22)
one sees that it involves the same kind of equity-efficiency tradeoff as condi-
tions (3.16) - (3.18): In (3.21), the efficiency loss of a marginal price increase
inducing people with taste parameter value θi = θˆ
A
i =
pA
i
QA
i
to cease demand-
ing admission to the public good is equated to the welfare gain from the
redistribution that is induced by this price increase. (3.22) shows that the
redistribution indeed involves a welfare gain rather than a welfare loss if the
additional welfare attached to a marginal increase in private good consump-
tion is lower, on average, for people with θi > θˆ
A
i than for the population as a
whole. Here again, one has to be careful about correlations and their effects
on the conditional expectation
∫
[0,1]mW
′ dF (n,θ−i|θi) in (3.22). However,
if the productivity and taste parameters are affiliated, the right-hand side
of (3.22) is nonnegative, indicating a welfare gain rather than a welfare loss
from the marginal redistribution effect.
However, even if the affiliation assumption on productivity and taste
parameters is satisfied, the equity-efficiency tradeoff in (3.22) does not nec-
essarily call for distortionary admission fees. In this respect, the formal
similarity of the equity-efficiency tradeoffs in (3.22) and in (3.16) - (3.18)
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hides an underlying difference.17 In Corollary 3.6, the positivity of the op-
timal marginal income tax for n ∈ (0, 1) is obtained from the familiar argu-
ment that, starting from an efficient allocation, the introduction of a small
wedge into leisure-consumption choices has first-order effects on redistribu-
tion gains and second-order effects on efficiency losses. For admission fees,
this argument is not available, because, when starting from an an efficient
allocation, i.e. an allocation involving zero admission fees, the effects of in-
troducing a small admission fee for public good i on redistribution gains are
of the same order of magnitude as the effects on efficiency losses from having
fewer people enjoy the public good. The reason is that, for pAi = θˆ
A
i = 0,
the redistribution effect on the right-hand side of (3.22) is zero because, up
to a set of measure zero, the set of people with θi > θˆ
A
i coincides with the
population as a whole. The first-order effects of small admission fees are
thus equal to zero, for redistribution gains as well as efficiency losses. The
desirability of positive admission fees cannot be assessed simply from the
first-order condition (3.15) or (3.22); it requires an investigation of second-
order conditions or, more generally, the global properties of the objective
function (3.8). As in Hellwig (2003), this investigation leads to the conclu-
sion that positive admission fees are undesirable if inequality aversion, i.e.
the curvature ρW (v) = −
W ′′(v)
W ′(v) of the welfare function W (.), is uniformly
small; in contrast, positive admission fees are desirable if inequality aversion
is uniformly large. These findings are summarized in the following result.
Proposition 3.8 (a) Let {Wk} be any sequence of increasing, concave, and
twice continuously differentiable functions on ℜ such that limk→∞ ρWk(v) =
0, uniformly in v, and let {Ak} be an associated sequence of second-best
allocations. Then pA
k
i = 0 for any sufficiently large k and limk→∞Q
Ak
i =
Q∗i .
(b) Let {Wk} be any sequence of increasing, concave, and twice contin-
uously differentiable functions on ℜ such that limk→∞ ρWk(v) = ∞, uni-
formly in v, and let {Ak} be an associated sequence of second-best allo-
cations. If A∞ is any limit point of the sequence {Ak}, then the pair
(QA
∞
, θˆ
A∞
) = (QA
∞
1 , ..., Q
A∞
m , θˆ1(p
A∞
1 ,Q
A∞
1 ), ..., θˆm(p
A∞
m ,Q
A∞
m )) is a solu-
17 As far as I can tell, the difference is due to the admission indicator χAi entering the
contribution χA
i
θiQ
A
i of public good i to the agent’s payoff in a linear fashion. Rene-
gotiation proofness and the induced zero-one structure of the admission rule χA
i
(., .) do
not seem play a role: Hellwig (2003) contains an example where χAi (.) ≡ 1 even though
renegotiation proofness is not imposed and nondegenerate randomization is admitted.
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tion to the monopoly problem
max
(QM ,θˆ
M
)
m∑
i=1
[θˆ
M
i Q
M
i (1− Fi(θˆ
M
i ))−K(Q
M)]. (3.23)
In particular, for any i ∈ Je, pA
k
i > 0 for any sufficiently large k.
The implications of Proposition 3.8 for the respective roles of admission
fees and direct taxes in public-goods finance are formulated as:
Corollary 3.9 Let A be a second-best allocation, and let TA(.) be the asso-
ciated income tax schedule.
(a) If ρW (v) is small, uniformly in v, then
K(QA) =
∫ 1
0
TA(yˆA(n)) dFn(n), (3.24)
i.e. public-goods provision is financed entirely from direct taxes.
(b) If ρW (v) is large, uniformly in v, then
m∑
i=1
pAi (1− F
i(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ))) > K(Q
A), (3.25)
i.e. public-goods provision is a money-making venture, with revenues exceed-
ing costs, providing additional resources for redistribution.
If inequality aversion is small, public goods should be entirely financed
from direct taxes, and the conclusion of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) is
confirmed.If inequality aversion is large, admission fees on excludable public
goods should be more than enough to cover costs. Indeed, in this case,
second-best allocations are close to Rawlsian allocations, which maximize
the payoff vA(0,θ) = cˆA(0) − γ(yˆA(0), 0) of the worst-off person in the
economy. In a Rawlsian allocation, public-goods provision is managed as a
profit-maximizing monopoly so as to maximize (for given yˆA(0)) the amount
of private-good consumption cˆA(0) that can be made available to people with
productivity and taste parameters all equal to zero.
Proposition 3.8 and Corollary 3.9 hold regardless of correlations between
the different parameters. In particular, they hold if all productivity and taste
parameters are stochastically independent, so utilitarian welfare maximiza-
tion may call for nonzero admission fees for excludable public goods even
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when there is no relation between public-goods preferences and productivity
levels. The difference between this finding and the results of Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) is due to redistributive concerns generated by the heterogen-
ity in public-goods preferences themselves.
Correlations between the different parameters matter for the structure
of admission fees and income taxes. because, as discussed above, they do
affect the first-order conditions (3.15) and (3.16) - (3.18). I conjecture that, if
the correlations between the different productivity and taste parameters are
everywhere strictly positive in the sense of the affiliation assumption, then
(at least some) admission fees should be higher than under independence.
3.3 Participation Constraints and the Generalized Ramsey-
Boiteux Problem
In addition to incentive compatibility, renegotiation proofness and feasi-
bility, I now impose the requirement that the allocation be individually
rational, so everybody is willing to participate voluntarily, and the mecha-
nism designer does not have to rely on the government’s power of coercion.
This additional requirement will add another perspective to the relation be-
tween income taxation and public-goods provision and pricing. In Hellwig
(2004 a), I had shown that, in a large economy with exogenous produc-
tion, the imposition of a participation constraint turns the condition for
feasibility into a government budget constraint requiring that the costs of
public-goods provision be covered by the payments that people are willing to
make in order to avoid exclusion from those public goods where exclusionis
feasible. With a requirement of renegotiation proofness as well as incen-
tive compatibility, the resulting mechanism design problem was shown to be
equivalent to the Ramsey-Boiteux problem of choosing a vector of admission
fees subject to the requirement that admission fee revenues suffice to cover
the costs of public-goods provision. Here I study how these implications
of the individual-rationality requirement are affected by the availability of
nonlinear income taxation as an additional source of finance.
The precise meaning of an individual-rationality requirement depends
on what alternatives and what payoffs are considered to be available outside
the proposed allocation. Here, I assume that people’s payoffs outside the
proposed allocation are equal to zero. If one person vetoes the allocation,
no alternative scheme is put into place, no production activity occurs, and
no public goods are provided.
This specification is somewhat stark. Specifications with rosier alterna-
tives to the proposed allocations may seem more plausible, e.g. specifications
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which allow people to produce the private good on their own. However, the
rosier the alternatives to the proposed allocation are, the more restrictive
the individual-rationality constraint is going to be. The specification that
is chosen here should be interpreted as a point of reference, indicating the
implications of imposing individual rationality in its least restrictive form.
Formally, an allocation A is said to be individually rational if the induced
payoffs satisfy
vA(n,θ) ≥ 0 (3.26)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1. If A is incentive compatible, vA(., .) is nondecreas-
ing, so (3.26) takes the form vA(0,0) ≥ 0. If A is also renegotiation proof,
this latter inequality in turn reduces to
v¯A(0) = cˆA(0)− γ(yˆA(0), 0) ≥ 0, (3.27)
where v¯A(0), cˆA(0), and yˆA(0) are given by Lemma 2.2 and Proposition 2.3.
Equivalently, the tax schedule TA(.) that is given by Remark 2.5 satisfies
TA(yˆA(0)) ≤ yˆA(0)− γ(yˆA(0), 0), (3.28)
i.e. the direct tax on people with productivity parameter zero does not
exceed the surplus generated by these people’s production. If this surplus
is zero, this amounts to a requirement that K(QA) be financed by income
taxes and admission fees, without any recourse to lump-sum payments from
participants at all.
An allocation is said to be third-best if it maximizes the welfare func-
tional (2.6) over the set of feasible, incentive compatible, renegotiation proof
and individually rational allocations. By the same argument as before, the
problem of choosing a third-best allocation is equivalent to the problem of
choosing public-goods provision levels QAi for i = 1, ...,m, admission prices
pAi for i ∈ J
e, an expected-payoff function v¯A(.) and nondecreasing func-
tions cˆA(.), yˆA(.) so as to maximize (3.8) subject to (3.9) - (3.11) and the
participation constraint (3.27). The following result provides an immediate
analogue of Proposition 3.4.
Proposition 3.10 Let A be a third-best allocation, let pA1 , ...p
A
m be the as-
sociated admissions prices and let cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.) be the associated con-
sumption, output provision and payoff functions. Then there exists a scalar
λ with
λ ≥
∫
[0,1]m+1
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ) (3.29)
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for which A, pA1 , ...p
A
m, and cˆ
A(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.) satisfy the conclusions of
Proposition 3.4, i.e. conditions (3.13) - (3.19). Moreover, λ satisfies (3.29)
with equality if v¯A(0) > 0.
Thus the imposition of the participation constraint (3.26) leaves the basic
structure of the first-order conditions for an optimal allocation unchanged.
The only change concerns the Lagrange multiplier for the feasibility con-
straint: When the participation constraint is binding, the feasibility con-
staint is harder to meet and has a higher shadow price. The mathematical
structure of the first-order conditions is unaffected, but the enhanced weight
of the feasibility constraint does introduce a qualitatively new consideration
into the determination of income taxes and admission fees. The difference
is highlighted by the following result.
Proposition 3.11 Let A be a third-best allocation, let pA1 , ...p
A
m be the as-
sociated admissions prices and let cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.) be the associated con-
sumption, output provision and payoff functions, and suppose that the in-
equality in (3.29) is strict. Then pAi > 0 for all i ∈ J
e. Moreover, there
exists nˆ > 0 such that γy(yˆ
A(n), n) < 1 and yˆA(n) < y∗(n), i.e. the optimal
marginal income tax rate is positive at yˆA(n) for all n ∈ [0, nˆ).18
Proposition 3.11 should be compared to Propositions 3.5 and 3.8. For a
second-best allocation, Proposition 3.5 indicates that, for people with n = 0,
in the absence of bunching, the optimal marginal income tax is equal to
zero. As discussed by Seade (1977), the reason is that, if we think of the
marginal income tax as a device providing for an additional levy on all
people with higher incomes to be used for redistribution to all people with
lower incomes, then, because there is nobody with an income below yˆA(0),
there is no point in using this device at yˆA(0), i.e. the marginal income tax
at zero should be zero. Here the additional levy on all people with higher
incomes that is induced by a positive marginal income tax at yˆA(0) makes
it possible to raise v¯A(0), i.e. to alleviate the participation constraint, or,
equivalently, to alleviate the difficulty of meeting the feasibility constraint
when the participation constraint restricts the use of lump sum taxation.
Similarly, part (a) of Proposition 3.8 indicates that, in a second-best
allocation, the use of admission fees as a redistribution device is undesirable
if inequality aversion is small. In this case, efficiency losses from such fees
18 If n˜ and θ˜1, ..., θ˜m are affiliated, nˆ = 1.
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are always larger than redistribution gains. The comparison is unaffected
by the fact that, for small values of the fees, efficiency losses are of the
second order of smalls; for small values of the fees, redistribution gains are
of the second order of smalls as well. In contrast, in a third-best setting, for
small values of the fees, there is a first-order gain from using admission fee
revenues to alleviate participation and feasibility constraints.
The participation constraint thus changes the role of the feasibility con-
straint or, equivalently, the government budget constraint. Whereas, in a
second-best setting, the implications of any change, for instance, a reduction
in an admission fee, on government revenue can be neutralized by a lump
sum change in private-good consumption, inducing an equal change in v¯A(n)
for all n; in a third-best setting, this device is not available. A lump sum
reduction in private-good consumption may run afoul of the participation
constraint, in which case, the implications of a reduction in an admission
fee on government revenue must be neutralized by another measure. One is
then not just trading off the efficiency effects and distribution effects of one
distortionary measure, neutralized by a lump sum change in private-good
consumption; as in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach to indirect taxation and
public-sector pricing, one is instead trading off the efficiency and distribu-
tion effects of different distortionary measures at the margin. This effect is
reflected in the Lagrange multiplier of the feasibility constraint exceeding∫
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ) when the participation constraint is binding.
The difference between third-best and second-best allocations is most
striking when the welfare function W (.) is affine and there is no inequality
aversion. For this case, Corollary 3.3 indicates that first-best and second-
best allocations coincide and that the participation constraint (3.26) is sat-
isfied if and only if
K(Q∗) ≤ y∗(0)− γ(y∗(0), 0), (3.30)
i.e. if and only if the surplus generated by a person with productivity pa-
rameter n = 0 exceeds the costs of first-best public-goods provision. In this
case, a lump sum tax K(Q∗) can be imposed without violating the partic-
ipation constraint; so neither distortionary income taxation nor admission
fees are needed for public-goods finance. If (3.30) does not hold, the impo-
sition of a lump sum tax equal to K(Q∗) is incompatible with individual
rationality. In this case, one obtains:
Proposition 3.12 Assume that W (.) is affine, and let A be a third-best
allocation. Let pA1 , ...p
A
m be the associated admissions prices and let cˆ
A(.),
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yˆA(.), v¯A(.) be the associated consumption, output provision and payoff func-
tions. If K(Q∗) > y∗(0) − γ(y∗(0), 0), there exists λ > 1 such that, for
i = 1, ...,m, ∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
(θi − θˆ
A
i )dFi(θi) + λθˆ
A
i (1− Fi(θˆ
A
i )) = λKi(Q
A) (3.31)
and, for any i /∈ Jne,
pAi fi(θˆ
A
i )
1
QAi
=
λ− 1
λ
(1− Fi(θˆ
A
i )), (3.32)
where again θˆ
A
i = θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ). Moreover,∫ 1
n
[
−(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)
(1− λ)
λ
(1− Fn(n′))
]
dn′ ≥ 0
(3.33)
for all n ∈ [0, 1]. If the inequality in (3.33) is strict, then yˆA(.) is constant
on some open neighbourhood of n. If yˆA(.) is strictly increasing at n, the
inequality in (3.33) holds as an equation; in particular,
(1− γy(yˆ
A(n), n)) fn(n) =
λ− 1
λ
(1− Fn(n)) (−γny(yˆ
A(n), n)) (3.34)
if, on some open neighbourhood of n, the monotonicity constraint on cˆA(.),
yˆA(.) is not binding.
Corollary 3.13 Under the assumptions of Proposition 3.12, γy(yˆ
A(n), n) <
1 and yˆA(n) < y∗(n) for all n ∈ [0, 1). Moreover, limn→1 γy(yˆ
A(n), n) = 1
and limn→1 yˆ
A(n) = y∗(1). Further, pAi > 0 for all i /∈ J
ne and Ki(Q
A) <∫ 1
0 θidF
i(θi) for all i; if K(.) is additively separable, then QAi < Q
∗
i for all
i.
If W (.) is affine, the problem of choosing a third-best allocation is
equivalent to the problem of choosing public-goods provision levels QAi for
i = 1, ...,m, admission prices pAi for i ∈ J
e, an expected-payoff function v¯A(.)
and nondecreasing functions cˆA(.), yˆA(.) so as to maximize the aggregate per
capita surplus∫ 1
0
v¯A(n)dFn(n) +
m∑
i=1
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i ) dF
i(θi) (3.35)
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subject to (3.9) - (3.11), and (3.27). I refer to this problem as the Generalized
Ramsey-Boiteux Problem. It differs from the Ramsey-Boiteux Problem as
discussed in Hellwig (2004 a) by the inclusion of the surplus from production,∫ 1
0
v¯A(n)dFn(n) =
∫ 1
0
[cˆA(n)− γ(yˆA(n), n)]dFn(n), (3.36)
in the objective function and by the inclusion of the revenue from direct
taxes, ∫ 1
0
[yˆA(n)− cˆA(n)]dFn(n) =
∫ 1
0
TA(yˆA(n)dFn(n), (3.37)
in the government budget constraint.19
Proposition 3.12 and Corollary 3.13 show that, in the Generalized Ramsey-
Boiteux Problem, if K(Q∗) > y∗(0) − γ(y∗(0), 0), it is always desirable to
rely on income taxation as an additional source of funds. The optimal mar-
ginal income tax is positive at all incomes below the maximum. However,
optimal admission fees are also positive, i.e. it is undesirable to rely only
on income taxes for public-goods finance. The Atkinson-Stiglitz critique of
the neglect of direct taxes in the Ramsey-Boiteux approach is thus partly
confirmed and partly refuted.
For a given value of the Lagrange multiplier, the first-order conditions
(3.31) and (3.32) for optimal public-good provision levels and admission fees
in the Generalized Ramsey-Boiteux Problem are identical to the correspond-
ing first-order conditions for the Ramsey-Boiteux problem in Hellwig (2004
a). As discussed there, with λ > 1, (3.31) implies that the marginal benefits
of public good i are less than λ times
∫ 1
0 θidF
i(θi), so for an additive cost
fuction, one has underprovision relative to the first-best level Q∗i . Condition
(3.32) can be interpreted as the degenerate form taken by the Ramsey-
Boiteux inverse-elasticities formula when variable costs of public-goods ad-
missions are all identically equal to zero.20 The term (1−F i(θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ))) on
the right-hand side indicates the level of aggregate demand for admissions to
public good i when the price is pAi and the ”quality”, i.e. the provision level,
19 The Generalized Ramsey-Boiteux Problem would reduce to the Ramsey-Boiteux Prob-
lem if I had specified the participation constraint in such a way that private-good produc-
tion cannot be taxed.
20 See, e.g., equation (15-23), p. 467, in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). If variable costs are
positive, e.g., if costs take the form K(Q,U1, ..., Um), where, for i = 1, ...,m, Ui :=
∫
πidF
is the aggregate use of public good i, equation (3.32) takes the form
(pi −
∂K
∂Ui
) fi(θˆ
A
i )
1
Qi
=
λ− 1
λ
(1− Fi(θˆ
A
i )),
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is QAi . The term f
i(θˆ
A
i )
1
QA
i
on the left-hand side indicates the absolute value
of the derivative of demand with respect to pAi . Condition (3.32) requires
admission fees to be chosen in such a way that the elasticities
ηAi :=
pAi
(1− Fi(θˆi(pAi , Q
A
i )))
fi(θˆi(p
A
i , Q
A
i ))
1
QAi
(3.38)
of demands for admissions to the different public goods are locally all the
same, i.e. that ηAi =
λ−1
λ for all i.
The first-order conditions for optimal admission fees in the Generalized
Ramsey-Boiteux Problem also have the same structure as the corresponding
conditions (3.15) for the second-best or third-best problem with inequality
aversion. By a simple rearrangement of terms, using (3.38), condition (3.15)
can be rewritten as
ηAi =
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]m(λ−W
′)dF (n,θ)
λ(1− F i(θˆi(pAi , Q
A
i )))
, (3.39)
which corresponds to the degenerate form for the case of zero variable costs
of the weighted inverse-elasticities formula of Diamond-Mirrlees (1971). The
weight ∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]m(λ−W
′)dF (n,θ)
λ(1− Fi(θˆi(pAi ,Q
A
i )))
= 1−
1
λ
∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]mW
′ dF (n,θ)∫ 1
θˆ
A
i
∫
[0,1]m dF (n,θ)
in (3.39) is a decreasing function of the conditional expectation of the so-
cial marginal valuation W ′(vA(n˜, θ˜)) of additional consumption for people
demanding admission to public good i. The admission fee pAi therefore
tends to be higher for a public good with a relatively low expected value of
W ′(vA(n˜, θ˜)), conditional on the information that admission to public good
i is requested.
The first-order conditions (3.33) - (3.34) for optimal income taxation in
the Generalized Ramsey-Boiteux Problem also have the same structure as
the corresponding conditions (3.16) - (3.18) for the second-best problem in
Proposition 3.4. The only significant difference between the conditions for
which yields the usual nondegenerate form
pi −
∂K
∂Ui
pi
=
λ− 1
λ
1
ηi
of the inverse-elasticities formula.
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income taxation here and in the second-best problem concerns the positivity
of the marginal income tax at the lowest productivity level.
The traditional alignment of nonlinear income taxation with utilitar-
ian redistribution and of public-sector pricing with government budget con-
straints thus needs to be reconsidered. In the present analysis, the conditions
for optimal income taxes and for optimal public-goods admission fees have
the same structure, regardless of whether we look at the second-best prob-
lem with utilitarian redistribution concerns or at the third-best problem
with a givernment budget constraint based on individual-rationality condi-
tions. Utilitarian concerns for redistribution affect welfare weights, but not
the overall structure of tax and pricing formulae.
I conclude this section with the observation that the distinction between
second-best and third-best allocations is moot if the mechanism designer’s
inequality aversion is sufficiently large. In this case, the mechanism designer
is particularly concerned about the payoffs of people who are worst off in the
economy. Second-best allocations then satisfy the participation constraint
(3.27) as a matter of course, and one obtains:
Proposition 3.14 Assume that productivity and taste parameters are af-
filiated, and let {Wk} be any sequence of increasing, concave, and twice
continuously differentiable functions on ℜ such that limk→∞ ρWk(v) = ∞,
uniformly in v. Then, for any sufficiently large k, second-best and third-best
allocations coincide.
4 Concluding Remarks
I conclude the paper with a few questions for further research. First, in this
paper, as in previous work, I have derived the government budget constraint
à la Ramsey-Boiteux from a requirement of interim individual rationality for
participants. Such a requirement eliminates unrestricted recourse to lump
sum taxes, but the resulting government budget constraint is still quite loose
and leaves a lot of rooms for cross-subsidization between different activities.
Some cross-subsidization may be desirable or even unavoidable, for instance,
the use of income taxes or of admission fees on excludable public goods to
finance the provision of nonexcludable public goods. However, in practice, a
system involving unrestricted cross-subsidization seems undesirable because
it provides bad incentives to managers of the different government activities.
Such incentive effects have not been part of the analysis here. Developing a
tractable model for studying them is an important task for future research.
Such a model should be the basis for assessing the costs and benefits of
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cross-subsidization between different activities — costs from incentive effects
versus benefits from reduced deadweight losses through distortionary taxes
and admission fees.21
A second set of questions concerns the role of cardinal utility specifica-
tions in utilitarian welfare maximization. This paper, like Hellwig (2003),
has relied on a particular cardinalization of public-goods preferences. One
may feel uneasy about the dependence of the analysis on the cardinaliza-
tion, but this unease concerns the utilitarian approach as such. Within this
approach, the Mirrlees-Seade analysis of optimal income taxation is just as
dependent on cardinal properties of utility representations of preferences
over consumption-leisure choices as my analysis of optimal utilitarian ad-
mission fees. Indeed, within the utilitarian approach, some reliance on a
specific cardinalization is unavoidable. However, it would be desirable to
have a clear view as to which properties of optimal income taxes and admis-
sion fees depend on the ordinal properties of individual utility specifications
and which properties depend on the cardinalization.
A final issue concerns the elicitation of preferences as a basis for imple-
menting suitable decisions about the provision of public goods. This issue
is a major concern of the theory of public-goods provision. However, in
the present paper, in a model of a large economy with independent private
values and a law of large numbers, it has not played any role because first-
best, second-best and third-best public-goods provision levels are common
knowledge. The question is whether this is the price to pay for the dras-
tic simplification of the mechanism design problem that is obtained from
the large-economy specification with anonymity. Or is it possible to have
large-economy specifications with "aggregate preference shocks", which have
the same simple structure for mechanism design and yet leave room for a
nontrivial effect of preference elicitation on public-goods provision?
A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2
Lemma 2.1 is practically the same as Lemma 3.1 in Hellwig (2004 a). There-
fore the reader is referred to the proof given there.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. By standard arguments, due to Mirrlees (1971,
21 For a first analysis of such a tradeoff in a somewhat different context, see Ch. 15 of
Laffont and Tirole (1993).
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1976), incentive compatibility of the allocation A implies that, for any n, the
section vA(n, ., ..., .) of the expected-payoff function vA that is determined
by n is continuous and convex and has partial derivatives vAi (.) satisfying
vAi (n, θ1, ..., θm) = χ
A
i (θ)Q
A
i (A.1)
for i = 1, ...,m and almost all (θ1, ..., θm) ∈ [0, 1]
m. By Lemma 2.1 and
(??), renegotiation proofness of A, with associated prices pA1 , ...p
A
m, implies
that (2.19) holds for i = 1, ...,m and almost all θ ∈ [0, 1]m+1. Convexity of
vA(n, ., ..., .) and (A.1) imply that, for any i, χAi (θ) is nondecreasing in θi,
so (2.19) must actually hold for all (rather than almost all) θ ∈ [0, 1]m+1.
Therefore (A.1) yields
vAi (n, θ1, ..., θm) = 0 if θiQ
A
i < p
A
i (A.2)
and
vAi (n, θ1, ..., θm) = Q
A
i if θiQ
A
i > p
A
i (A.3)
for all i and all θ =(n, θ1, ..., θm) ∈ [0, 1]m+1. By integration, one obtains
(2.18) with
v¯A(n) := vA(n, 0, ..., 0). (A.4)
Proof of Proposition 2.3. As mentioned in the text, the argument
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, I show that an allocation A is rene-
gotiation proof and incentive compatible if and only if it satisfies statement
(a) and the incentive constraint (2.26). The ”only if” part of this claim is
trivial: By Lemma 2.2, renegotiation proofness and incentive compatibility
of A imply the validity of statement (a). The validity of (2.26) follows from
the validity of statement (a) and incentive compatibility.
To prove the ”if” part of the claim, I note that if the admission indicators
χAi (n,θ) satisfy (2.19), (2.20), then for almost all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]
m+1, one has
χAi (n,θ) = 0 if θiQ
A
i < p
A
i and χ
A
i (n,θ) = 1 if θiQ
A
i > p
A
i ; so renegotiation
proofness follows by Lemma 2.1. If statement (a) holds, one also has
v(n,θ) = v¯A(n) +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0) (A.5)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1. From (A.5) and (2.20), one immediately obtains
v(n,θ) ≥ v¯A(n) +
m∑
i=1
χ¯Ai (θ
′
i) (θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0) (A.6)
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for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1 and all θ′ = (θ′1, ..., θ
′
m) ∈ [0, 1]
m. If (2.26) also
holds, it follows that
v(n,θ) ≥ v¯A(n′)+γ(yA(n′,θ′), n′)−γ(yA(n′,θ′), n)+
m∑
i=1
π¯Ai (θ
′
i) (θiQ
A
i −p
A
i , 0)
(A.7)
for all (n,θ) and all (n′,θ′) in [0, 1]m+1, so by (2.21) and (2.22), it follows
that
v(n,θ) ≥ cA0 (n
′,θ′)− γ(yA(n′,θ′), n) +
m∑
i=1
π¯Ai (θ
′
i) (θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0)
= cA(n′,θ′)− γ(yA(n′,θ), n) +
m∑
i=1
πAi (n
′,θ′) θiQ
A
i (A.8)
for all (n,θ) and all (n′,θ′) in [0, 1]m+1, which is just the condition for
incentive compatibility of A. The ”if” part of the claim is thereby proved,
and the first step in the proof of Proposition 2.3 is completed.
For the second step in the proof, I note that, by standard arguments, as
in Mirrlees (1976), for any θ ∈ [0, 1]m, the incentive compatibility condition
(2.26) implies that
v¯A(n) = −
∫ n
0
γn(y
A(n′,θ), n′)dn′ (A.9)
for all n. (A.9) implies that the function n→ v¯A(n) is absolutely continuous,
hence almost everywhere differentiable, with derivative
dv¯A
dn
(n) = −γn((y
A(n,θ), n). (A.10)
Because the left-hand side of (A.10) is independent of θ and, with γny < 0,
the right-hand side is strictly increasing in yA(n,θ), it follows that yA(n,θ)
is independent of θ; thus there exists a function yˆA(.) such that yA(n,θ) =
yˆA(n) for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, so (2.26) becomes (2.25).
As mentioned in the text, Remark 2.4 follows from the arguments of
Mirrlees (1976), pp. 334 f., and is not again proved here.
Proof of Remark 2.5. The first statement of remark is equivalent to
the statement that the map
n→ yˆA(n)− v¯A(n)− γ(yˆA(n), n) (A.11)
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from [0, 1] into ℜ is measurable with respect to the σ-algebra on [0, 1] that
is generated by the map n→ yˆA(n), i.e. that
yˆA(n)− v¯A(n)− γ(yˆA(n), n) = yˆA(nˆ)− v¯A(nˆ)− γ(yˆA(nˆ), nˆ) (A.12)
whenever yˆA(n) = yˆA(nˆ). To establish this property, suppose that yˆA(n) =
yˆA(nˆ) for some n, nˆ, and, without loss of generality, let nˆ < n.By Proposition
2.3 and Remark 2.4, the function yˆA(.) is nondecrasing, and one has yˆA(n′) =
yˆA(n) for all n′ ∈ [nˆ, n]. From (2.28) and (2.32), one then has
v¯A(n) = v¯A(nˆ)−
∫ n
nˆ
γn(yˆ
A(n), n′)dn′,
hence
v¯A(n) = v¯A(nˆ)− γ(yˆA(n), n) + γ(yˆA(n), nˆ)
and
yˆA(n)− v¯A(n)− γ(yˆA(n), n) = yˆA(n)− v¯A(nˆ)− γ(yˆA(n), nˆ).
Because yˆA(n) = yˆA(nˆ), (A.12) follows immediately, and the first statement
of the remark is proved.
Using (2.28), one can rewrite (2.35) in the form
TA(yˆA(n)) = yˆA(n)− v¯A(0)− γ(yˆA(n), n) +
∫ n
0
γn(yˆ
A(n′), n′)dn′
= yˆA(0)− v¯A(0)− γ(yˆA(0), 0) +
∫ n
0
(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))dyˆA(n′).
The second statement of the remark follows immediately.
A.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proposition 3.1 is standard, so its proof is left to the reader. Corollary 3.2
follows from Proposition 3.1 and the argument given in the text.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. Given that a first-best allocation is renego-
tiation proof, by Proposition 2.3 and Remark 2.4 the allocation is incentive
compatible if and only if
cA(n,θ) = v¯A(0)−
∫ n
0
γn(y
∗(n′), n′)dn′ + γ(y∗(n), n) (A.13)
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for all n and θ. By (3.1), (A.13) can be rewritten as
cA(n,θ) = v¯A(0)−
∫ n
0
d
dn
(y∗(n′)− γ(y∗(n′), n′))dn′ + γ(y∗(n), n)
= v¯A(0) + y∗(n)− [y∗(0)− γ(y∗(0), 0)]. (A.14)
Given (A.14), (3.7) follows from the feasibility condition (2.31).
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Given the allocation A, define a function
WA0 by setting
WA0 (v, n,Q
A,pA) :=
∫
[0,1]m
W
(
v +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0)
)
dF (θ|n)
(A.15)
for any v ∈ ℜ, n ∈ [0, 1], QA ∈ ℜm+ , and p
A ∈ ℜm+ . If A is a second-best
allocation, then QA,pA, and the associated consumption, output provision
and payoff functions cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.) must also be a solution to the problem
of maximizing ∫
[0,1]
W0(v¯
A(n), n,QA,pA)fn(n)dn (A.16)
subject to (3.9) - (3.11) and the requirement that yˆA(.) be nondecreas-
ing. This problem in turn is equivalent to the problem of choosing QA,pA,
yˆA(.) and v¯A(.) so as to maximize (A.16) subject to the feasibility constraint∫ 1
0
[yˆA(n)−v¯A(n)−γ(yˆA(n), n)]fn(n)dn ≤ K(QA1 , ...,Q
A
m)−
m∑
i=1
pAi (1−F
i(θˆi(p
A
i ,Q
A
i ))),
(A.17)
the incentive compatibility condition
dv¯A
dn
= −γn(yˆ
A(n), n) (A.18)
and the monotonicity requirement on yˆA(.). Except for the fact that the
integrand in (A.16) depends on QA,pA and the productivity parameter n
as well as the payoff level v¯A(n), the latter problem is a standard problem
of optimal utilitarian income taxation à la Mirrlees (1971, 1976) or Seade
(1977, 1982) and can be handled by control theoretic methods. As discussed
in Hellwig (2004 c), for any solution QA,pA, yˆA(.), v¯A(.) to this problem,
there exists a real number λ ≥ 0 and there exist two absolutely continuous
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functions ψA(.), χA(.) such that (3.13) holds for i ∈ Jne, (3.14) and (3.15)
hold for i ∈ Je, and, for any n, one has
dψA
dn
= −
[
∂WA0
∂v
(v¯A(n), n,QA,pA)− λ
]
fn(n), (A.19)
dχA
dn
= −λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n), n))fn(n) + ψA(n)γny(yˆ
A(n), n), (A.20)
and
χA(n) ≤ 0, (A.21)
the latter condition holding with equality unless yˆA(n′) = yˆA(n) for all n′
in some open neighbourhood of n. Moreover, ψA(.) and χA(.) satisfy the
transversality conditions
ψA(0) = ψA(1) = 0 (A.22)
and
χA(1) = 0. (A.23)
By a straightforward integration, (A.19) and (A.22) yield
λ =
∫ 1
0
∂WA0
∂v
(v¯A(n), n,QA,pA)fn(n)dn, (A.24)
which implies (3.12). By another integration, (A.20) and (A.23) yield
χA(n) +
∫ 1
n
[−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + ψA(n′)γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)] = 0,
(A.25)
for all n, so (A.21) implies that∫ 1
n
[−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + ψA(n′)γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)] ≥ 0, (A.26)
the inequality holding as an equation unless yˆA(n′) = yˆA(n) for all n′ in
some open neighbourhood of n. If yˆA(.) is strictly increasing on some open
neighbourhood of n, one must have χA(n′) = 0 and dχ
A
dn (n
′) = 0 for all n′
belonging to this open neighbourhood, hence in particular,
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n), n))fn(n) + ψA(n)γny(yˆ
A(n), n) = 0. (A.27)
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Proof of Proposition 3.5. I first show that, under the given assump-
tions, for vA(n,θ) satisfying
vA(n,θ) = v¯A(n) +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0), (A.28)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, the map
n′ →
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n′,θ)
)
dF (θ|n′) (A.29)
is stictly decreasing. Let n1 and n2 be such that n1 < n2, and note that,
by the concavity of W, the function (n′,θ)→W ′
(
vA(n2,θ)
)
is nonincreas-
ing. By Theorem 5, p. 1100, of Milgrom and Weber (1982) therefore, the
affiliation assumption on F implies that∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n2,θ)
)
dF (θ|n1) ≥
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n2,θ)
)
dF (θ|n2).
By the strict concavity of W and the strict monotonicity of v¯A(.), it follows
that ∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n1,θ)
)
dF (θ|n1) >
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n2,θ)
)
dF (θ|n2),
as claimed.
Given the strict monotonicity of (A.29), there exists a unique nˆ such
that ∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n′,θ)
)
dF (θ|n′)  λ as n′  nˆ. (A.30)
From (A.30), one infers that the function
n→ ψA(n) =
∫ 1
n
[∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n′,θ)
)
dF (θ|n′)− λ
]
dFn(n′)
is decreasing for n < nˆ and increasing for n > nˆ. Because (A.22) implies
ψA(1) = ψA(0) = 0, it follows that nˆ ∈ (0, 1) and that ψA(n) < 0 for all
n ∈ (0, 1).
From here on, the argument is routine: If n ∈ (0, 1) is such that yˆA(.) is
strictly increasing at n, Proposition 3.4 implies∫ 1
n
[
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)
]
dn′ = 0
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as well as∫ 1
nˆ
[
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)
]
dn′ ≥ 0
for all nˆ > n, hence∫ nˆ
n
[
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)
]
dn′ ≤ 0
for all nˆ > n. It follows that there exists a sequence {nk} converging to n
from above such that
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(nk), nk))fn(nk) + γny(yˆ
A(nk), nk)ψA(nk) ≤ 0 (A.31)
for all k. Exploiting the monotonicity of yˆA(.), one may define y¯A(n) =
limnk↓n yˆ
A(nk). Upon taking limits in (A.31), relying on the continuity of
γy, γny, and ψ
A, one obtains−λ(1−γy(y¯
A(n), n))fn(n)+γny(y¯
A(n), n)ψA(n) ≤
0, hence γy(y¯
A(n), n) < 1. By the monotonicity of yˆA(.), one also has
yˆA(n) ≤ y¯A(n), so by the convexity of γ(., n), γy(y¯
A(n), n) < 1 implies
γy(yˆ
A(n), n) < 1.
Alternatively, if yˆA(.) is constant on some open neighbourhood of n,
there exists nˆ < n such that yˆA(.) is strictly increasing at nˆ, and moreover,
yˆA(n′) = yˆA(n) for all n′ ∈ (nˆ, n]. By the argument just given, one has
limn′↓nˆ γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′) < 1, hence γy(yˆ
A(nˆ), nˆ) < 1. Because γny < 0, it
follows that γy(yˆ
A(n), n) < 1.
Turning to the behaviour of yˆA(.) for n close to one, I note that (3.16)
can be rewritten in the form∫ 1
n γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)dn′
1− n
≥
∫ 1
n λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′)dn′
1− n
. (A.32)
Because γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′)) < 1 for n′ ∈ (0, 1), the right-hand side of (A.32)
is nonnegative. Because ψA(1) = 0, the left-hand side of (A.32) converges
to zero as n converges to one. The right-hand side of (A.32) must then
also converge to zero. Given the monotonicity of yˆA(.), it follows that
limn′↑1 γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′)) = 1.
As for the behaviour of yˆA(.) for n close to zero, if there exists a sequence
{nk} of points at which yˆA(.) is increasing, then by Proposition 3.4, one has∫ nk
nk+1
[
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′) + γny(yˆ
A(n′), n′)ψA(n′)
]
dn′ = 0
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for all k. Then there exist sequences {nˆk}, {n¯k} converging to zero such that
for all k one has
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(nˆk), nˆk))fn(nˆk) + γny(yˆ
A(nˆk), nˆk)ψA(nˆk) ≤ 0
and
−λ(1− γy(yˆ
A(n¯k), n¯k))fn(n¯k) + γny(yˆ
A(n¯k), n¯k)ψA(n¯k) ≥ 0.
Upon defining y¯A(0) := limn↓0 yˆ
A(n) and taking limits, as before, one ob-
tains
−λ(1− γy(y¯
A(0), 0))fn(0) + γny(y¯
A(0), 0)ψA(0) ≤ 0
and
−λ(1− γy(y¯
A(0), 0))fn(0) + γny(y¯
A(0), 0)ψA(0) ≥ 0,
hence λ(1−γy(y¯
A(0), 0))fn(0) = γny(y¯
A(0), 0)ψA(0). Because ψA(0) = 0, it
follows that γy(y¯
A(0), 0) = 1 and hence that limn↓0 γy(yˆ
A(n), n) = 1.
Corollary 3.6 follows immediately from Proposition 3.5 and Remark 2.5.
Proposition 3.7 follows from Proposition 3.4 and the arguments given in the
text.
The proof of Proposition 3.8 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 There exists B > 0, such that
0 ≤ vA(n,θ)− vA(0,0) ≤ B (A.33)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1 and any allocation A which is second-best for some
welfare function W.
Proof. Let A be a second-best allocation for some welfare function W.
By Lemma 2.2, (A.33) is equivalent to
0 ≤ v¯A(n)− v¯A(0) +
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0) ≤ B. (A.34)
From (2.28), one has
0 ≤ v¯A(n)− v¯A(0) ≤ v¯A(1)− v¯A(0) ≤ γ(yˆA(1), 0)− γ(yˆA(1), 1)
for all n ∈ [0, 1]. From Proposition 3.5, one also has yˆA(1) = y∗(1), where
y∗(1) is again the first-best output provision level for the productivity pa-
rameter n = 1. Hence
0 ≤ v¯A(n)− v¯A(0) ≤ γ(y∗(1), 0)− γ(y∗(1), 1) (A.35)
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for all n ∈ [0, 1]. Turning to the other term in (A.34), one obviously has
0 ≤
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
Ak
i , 0) ≤
m∑
i=1
QAi .
By Proposition 3.7, one has Ki(Q
A) ∈ [0,
∫ 1
0 θidFi(θi)] for i = 1, ...,m.
By the strict convexity of K(.), in combination with the continuity and
boundary conditions on Ki(.), i = 1, ...,m, it follows that Q
A belongs to a
compact set Q ⊂ ℜm+ , which is independent of A and W. Upon choosing Q¯
so that
∑m
i=1Qi for all Q ∈ Q, one concludes that
0 ≤
m∑
i=1
max(θiQ
A
i − p
A
i , 0) ≤ Q¯ (A.36)
for all θ ∈ [0, 1]n. If one sets B = γ(y∗(1), 0) − γ(y∗(1), 1) + Q¯, one finds
that (A.34), and hence (A.33), hold for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1.
Proof of Proposition 3.8. (a) Let R > 0 be such that
sup
θˆi∈[0,1]
Fi(θˆi)
Fi(θˆi) + θˆifi(θˆi)
< e−RB (A.37)
for all i, where B is given by Lemma A.1. Let the welfare function W be
such that ρW (v) ≤ R for all v, and let A be a second-best allocation for W.
By a straightforward integration, one obtains
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
≥W ′
(
vA(0,0)
)
exp
(
−R[vA(n,θ)− vA(0,0)]
)
,
so (A.34) implies that
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
≤W ′
(
vA(0,0)
)
e−RB (A.38)
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1. Upon combining (A.37) and (A.38), one finds that
−(Fi(θˆi) + θˆifi(θˆi))W
′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
+W ′
(
vA(0,0)
) ∫ θˆi
0
dFi(θ
′
i) < 0
for all (n,θ) ∈ [0, 1]m+1, all i and all θˆi ∈ (0, 1]. Because W
′(.) is nonde-
creasing, it follows that
−(Fi(θˆi) + θˆifi(θˆi))λ+
∫ θˆi
0
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ) < 0,
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for all i and all θˆi ∈ (0, 1], which is equivalent to
(1− Fi(θˆi)− θˆifi(θˆi))λ−
∫ 1
θˆi
∫
[0,1]m
W ′
(
vA(n,θ)
)
dF (n,θ) < 0
for all i and all θˆi ∈ (0, 1]. For any i, therefore, θˆ
A
i = 0 is the unique
solution to the first-order condition (3.15), and one must have pAi = 0. The
first statement in part (a) of the proposition is thereby proved. The second
statement in (a) follows from a standard upper hemi-continuity argument
and Corollary 3.3.
(b) Let v∗ be the maximum of vA(0,0) over the set of allocations A that
are feasible, incentive compatible and renegotiation proof, and let A∗ be an
allocation at which the maximum is reached, so vA
∗
(0,0) = v∗. I claim that
for any allocation A satisfying (A.33), as well as vA(0,0) < v∗, one has∫
[0,1]m+1
W (vA(n,θ))dF (n,θ) <
∫
[0,1]m+1
W (vA
∗
(n,θ))dF (n,θ) (A.39)
for any welfare function W such that ρW (v) is sufficiently large, uniformly
in v. To prove this claim, I note that, for any concave function W, any v
and any δ ≥ 0, one has
W (v) ≤W (v∗ + δ) +W ′(v∗ + δ)(v − v∗ − δ); (A.40)
in particular,
W (v) ≤W (v∗) +W ′(v∗)(v − v∗). (A.41)
For any allocation A, let GA be the distribution of the payoff vA(n˜, θ˜) that
is induced by A, so one has∫
[0,1]m+1
W (vA(n,θ))dF (n,θ) =
∫
ℜ
W (v)dGA(v).
Upon applying (A.41) for v ≤ v∗ and (A.40) for v > v∗, one finds that∫
ℜ
W (v)dGA(v) ≤
∫ v∗
−∞
[W (v∗) +W ′(v∗)(v − v∗)]dGA(v)
+
∫ ∞
v∗
[W (v∗ + δ) +W ′(v∗ + δ)(v − v∗ − δ)]dGA(v)
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for all δ ≥ 0. If the allocation A satisfies (A.33), it follows that∫
ℜ
W (v)dGA(v) ≤ W (v∗) +W ′(v∗)
∫ v∗
−∞
(v − v∗)dGA(v)
+W (v∗ + δ)−W (v∗) +W ′(v∗ + δ)(B − v∗ − δ)
∫ ∞
v∗
dGA(v)
≤ W (v∗) +W ′(v∗)
∫ v∗
−∞
(v − v∗)dGA(v)
+W ′(v∗)δ +W ′(v∗ + δ)(B − v∗)
for all δ ≥ 0. If W is such that ρW (v) ≥ R¯ for all v, it follows that∫
ℜ
W (v)dGA(v) ≤ W (v∗) +W ′(v∗)
∫ v∗
−∞
(v − v∗)dGA(v) (A.42)
+W ′(v∗)[δ + e−R¯δ(B − v∗)]
for all δ ≥ 0. If A is such that GA((−∞, v∗)) > 0, then for R¯ sufficiently
large and, e.g., δ = R¯−1/2, (A.42) implies∫
ℜ
W (v)dGA(v) < W (v∗),
and (A.39) follows immediately.
For any sequence {Wk} of increasing, concave and twice continuously
differentiable functions on ℜ such that limk→∞ ρWk(v) = ∞, uniformly in
v, an associated sequence {Ak} of second-best allocations must therefore
satisfy limk→∞G
Ak((−∞, v∗)) = 0, or
lim
k→∞
F ({(n,θ)|vA
k
(n,θ) < v∗}) = 0. (A.43)
One easily verifies that (A.43) is only possible if limk→∞ v
Ak(0,0) = v∗. By
continuity, it follows that any limit point A∞ of the sequence {Ak} satisfies
vA
∞
(0,0) = v∗ and is therefore a maximizer of vA(0,0) over the set of
feasible, renegotiation proof and incentive-compatible allocations. Part (b)
of the proposition follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 3.10. Proceeding exactly as in the proof of
Proposition 3.4, one finds that for any third-best allocation A with associ-
ated entry fees pAi , i ∈ J
e, and consumption, output provision and payoff
functions cˆA(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.), there exists a real number λ ≥ 0 and there ex-
ist two absolutely continuous functions ψA(.), χA(.) such that, (3.13) holds
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for i ∈ Jne, (3.14) and (3.15) hold for i ∈ Je, and for any n, (A.19) -
(A.21) and (A.23) are satisfied, where (A.21) again holds with equality un-
less yˆA(n′) = yˆA(n) for all n′ in some open neighbourhood of n. However,
the transversality conditions for ψA(.) are now
ψA(1) = 0 (A.44)
and
ψA(0) ≤ 0, (A.45)
with the complementary-slackness condition
ψA(0)v¯A(0) = 0. (A.46)
From (A.19) and (A.44), one obtains
ψA(0) =
∫ 1
0
∂WA0
∂v
(v¯A(n), n,QA,pA)fn(n)dn− λ. (A.47)
Upon using (A.47) to substitute for ψA(0) in (A.45) and (A.46), one obtains
(3.29) as well as the complementary-slackness condition[∫ 1
0
W ′(vA(n,θ))dF (n,θ)− λ
]
v¯A(0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.11. If the inequality in (3.29) is strict, there
exists nˆ > 0 such that the costate variable ψA(.) satisfies ψA(n) < 0 for all
n ∈ [0, nˆ). The first statement of the proposition then follows by the same
argument as in the proof of Proposition 3.5. One notes that, for any i ∈ Je,
at θˆ
A
i = 0, the left-hand side of (3.15) is positive if the inequality in (3.29)
is strict. The first-order condition (3.15) is thus incompatible with pAi = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. If W (.) is affine, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that W ′(v) = 1 for all v. If the allocation A, with
associated pA1 , ...p
A
m and cˆ
A(.), yˆA(.), v¯A(.), is a solution to the third-best
welfare maximization problem when W ′(.) ≡ 1, then by Proposition 3.10,
there exists λ ≥ 1 such that (3.31) - (3.34) hold. To complete the proof,
it suffices to show that λ > 1. If λ were equal to one, one should have
QA = Q∗, pAi = 0 for all i and∫ 1
n
(1− γy(yˆ
A(n′), n′))fn(n′)dn′ ≤ 0 (A.48)
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for all n ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, if the inequality in (A.48) were strict, then
yˆA(.) would be constant on some open neighbourhood of n. If yˆA(.) were
strictly increasing at n, the inequality in (A.48) would hold as an equa-
tion. However, the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.5 im-
ply that γy(yˆ
A(n), n)) ≤ 1 for all n, so (A.48) is only possible if one has
γy(yˆ
A(n), n)) = 1 and yˆA(n) = y∗(n) for all n. By Remark 2.5, it follows
that yˆA(n)− cˆA(n) = yˆA(0)− cˆA(0) for all n. Given that QA = Q∗, pAi = 0
for all i and yˆA(n)− cˆA(n) = yˆA(0)− cˆA(0) for all n, the feasibility constraint
implies cˆA(0) ≤ yˆA(0) − K(Q∗). By Proposition 2.3 and the participation
constraint, it follows that 0 ≤ v¯A(0) ≤ yˆA(0) − K(Q∗) − γ(yˆA(0), 0) and
hence that K(Q∗) ≤ y∗(0)− γ(y∗(0), 0). The assumption that one can have
λ = 1 when K(Q∗) > y∗(0)−γ(y∗(0), 0) has thus led to a contradiction and
must be false. Hence K(Q∗) > y∗(0)− γ(y∗(0), 0) implies λ > 1.
Proof of Proposition 3.14. Let {Ak} be a sequence of second-
best allocations associated with the sequence {Wk}. By Proposition 3.4, the
feasibility constraint (3.9) is always binding, so one has∫ 1
0
[yˆA
k
(n)−cˆA
k
(n)]dFn(n) = K(QA
k
1 , ...,Q
Ak
m )−
m∑
i=1
pA
k
i (1−F
i(θˆi(p
Ak
i , Q
Ak
i )))
for all k. By Remark 2.5, Corollary 3.6, and Proposition 3.8, it follows that
TA
k
(0) = yˆA
k
(0)− cˆA
k
(0) < 0,
and therefore
v¯A
k
(0) > yˆA
k
(0)− γ(yˆA
k
(0), 0)
for any sufficiently large k. By Proposition 3.5, one also has yˆA
k
(0) ∈
[0, y∗(0)] for all k. Since γ(0, 0) = 0, It follows that yˆA
k
(0) ≥ γ(yˆA
k
(0), 0) for
all k and, hence, that v¯A
k
(0) > 0 for any sufficiently large k. For any suffi-
ciently large k, the second-best allocation Ak thus satisfies the participation
constraint; consequently, it is also a third-best allocation. Any other third-
best allocation must then provide the same overall welfare as the second-best
allocation Ak and must also be second-best.
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